<![CDATA[This article examines Indonesia's 2026 Election Bill as an arena of oligarchic cartel adaptation within the country's electoral democracy. Building on prior research concerning oligarchic cartelization in the legislative process of the 2017 Election Law, it situates the analysis in the current context of Constitutional Court decisions, meaningful participation, and the regulatory agenda for the 2029 elections. Using a socio-legal approach and a conceptual-policy analysis design, the article examines five mechanisms of oligarchic cartel adaptation: legislative agenda control, the conversion of Constitutional Court decisions into new legal norms, the formalistic absorption of public participation, threshold redesign, and financial opacity. The article argues that electoral law reform should not be understood merely as a technocratic agenda, but as a contested field between democratic participation and oligarchic wealth. Constitutional Court decisions and meaningful participation may open opportunities for democratic correction. However, such opportunities can be neutralized when the legislative process remains controlled by actors who benefit from electoral rules. The article contributes by operationalizing the concept of oligarchic cartel adaptation as an evaluative framework for the 2026 Election Bill.]]>
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