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Contact Name
Miranti Kartika Dewi
Contact Email
miranti.kartika@ui.ac.id
Phone
+62 21 7272425 (ext. 506)
Journal Mail Official
jaki@ui.ac.id
Editorial Address
Department of Accounting, Faculty of Economics and Business Universitas Indonesia Kampus UI Depok, Jawa Barat, 16424, Indonesia
Location
Kota depok,
Jawa barat
INDONESIA
Jurnal Akuntansi dan Keuangan Indonesia
Published by Universitas Indonesia
ISSN : 18298494     EISSN : 24069701     DOI : 10.7454/jaki
Core Subject :
JAKI aims to contribute to the development of knowledge and practice of accounting and finance by publishing theoretical and empirical research papers showcasing Indonesia as well as other emerging and developed markets. Authors are invited to submit articles that address the discourses of accounting and finance from various fields of study, such as financial accounting, public sector accounting, management accounting, Islamic accounting and financial management, auditing, capital market based accounting research, corporate governance, ethics and professionalism, corporate finance, accounting education, behavioral accounting, taxation, banking, information system, sustainability reporting, comprehensive corporate reporting, and climate change-related reporting. The contributed papers may cover the following ranges of subjects but are not limited to: - Discussion and exploration of new theory and knowledge of public, corporate and nonprofit accounting and finance - Empirical investigations providing novel and contributions substantial contributions in the above topical areas of interest - Case studies exploring accounting and finance practices are also welcome
Arjuna Subject : -
Articles 271 Documents
TERM LIMIT EFFECTS IN INDONESIA: LOCAL GOVERNMENT REVENUE VS. SPENDING Muamarah, Hanik Susilawati
Jurnal Akuntansi dan Keuangan Indonesia Vol. 23, No. 1
Publisher : UI Scholars Hub

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Abstract

Background: The term limit of local leaders creates a puzzle between the "lame-duck effect" (declining performance) and the "competence effect" (improved performance). This study contextualizes this dilemma within the Indonesian context, which has strong incentives for non-re-election, such as the formation of political dynasties. We investigate this puzzle by examining the relationship between term-limited leaders and two distinct fiscal policy areas: regulation-bound tax revenue and discretionary capital expenditure. Methods: A fixed-effects model was employed to analyze panel data from 438 regencies and municipalities from 2017 to 2023. Findings: In the high-discretion area of spending, term-limited leaders increase capital expenditure, supporting agency theory, which suggests that leaders seek reputational incentives by leaving behind physical legacy projects. In contrast, no significant effect was found in the low-discretion revenue area, indicating that institutional constraints neutralize both the lame-duck and competence effects. Our model did not find sufficient support for the moderating effect of the COVID-19 pandemic as an external shock. Conclusion: The effect of term limits depends on policy discretion. Leaders pursue reputational incentives in high-discretion areas (spending), whereas the effect is limited in low-discretion areas (revenue). Novelty/Originality of this article: This study contributes to public sector accounting research by examining the connection between political incentives and local government fiscal policy decisions, with a focus on how term-limited leaders utilize their discretion in capital expenditure, particularly within a developing country and pandemic context subject to agency constraints.