Henry Clifford
Department of Civil Law, Valencia Legal Institute, Coro, Venezuela

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The Power Imbalance Personified: A Mixed-Methods Analysis of Senior-to-Junior Bullying in Indonesia's Medi-cal Residency Programs Alex Putra Pratama; Henry Clifford; Ahmad Erza; Ericca Dominique Perez; Fakhrul Setiobudi; Dedi Affandi; Lestini Wulansari; Fachrudin Sani; Vita Amanda; Zahra Amir
Enigma in Education Vol. 3 No. 1 (2025): Enigma in Education
Publisher : Enigma Institute

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | DOI: 10.61996/edu.v3i1.92

Abstract

Background. Bullying during medical residency harms residents’ mental health and threatens patient safety. In Indonesia, where medical hierarchies are firmly entrenched, bullying of junior residents by senior residents has received little study. Objective. To examine the prevalence, forms, and lived experience of senior-to-junior bullying in Indonesian residency programs from the perspective of junior residents. Methods. A sequential explanatory mixed-methods design was used. An anonymous online survey including the Negative Acts Questionnaire-Revised (NAQ-R) was completed by 584 junior residents at five teaching hospitals. Twenty-five residents with high exposure were purposively selected for semi-structured interviews. Data were analyzed with descriptive and inferential statistics and reflexive thematic analysis. Results. Of the respondents, 81.3% (n = 475) reported at least one negative act weekly or daily. Work-related acts and personal humiliation were the most common forms. Bullying was associated with year of residency (87.2% vs 72.1%) and specialty (70.5% in pediatrics to 89.9% in surgery), but not with gender or marital status. Four themes emerged: hierarchy as a mandate for abuse, a pedagogy of fear, silent suffering, and a perpetuating cycle. Conclusion. Bullying by senior residents was highly prevalent, was often justified as training, and was sustained by silence. Systemic change, faculty training, and confidential reporting systems are needed.
Plutocracy in the Protocol: A Quantitative Triangulation of Power Concentration in Decentralized Finance Governance Arya Ganendra; Neva Dian Permana; Muhammad Faiz; Henry Clifford
Enigma in Economics Vol. 3 No. 2 (2025): Enigma in Economics
Publisher : Enigma Institute

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | DOI: 10.61996/economy.v3i2.104

Abstract

Decentralized Finance (DeFi) proposes a paradigm shift towards a democratized financial ecosystem governed by its users. This vision of decentralization is predicated on the distribution of governance tokens. However, the verity of this claim lacks rigorous empirical validation, raising concerns about a potential "decentralization illusion." This study quantitatively investigates the concentration of governance power within leading DeFi protocols to empirically test this narrative. We employed a multi-faceted quantitative triangulation framework using on-chain data from three archetypal DeFi protocols, selected to represent the core sectors of the ecosystem: a lending market (ProtoLend), a decentralized exchange (ProtoSwap), and a yield aggregator (ProtoYield). Our methodology integrates: (1) Empirical Network Analysis based on on-chain voting power delegation to map the topology of influence; (2) Economic Inequality Metrics, including the Gini Coefficient and Lorenz Curve Analysis, to quantify the distribution of governance tokens; and (3) Systemic Risk Assessment via the Nakamoto Coefficient to determine the minimum number of colluding actors required for a 51% governance attack. The empirical network analysis revealed a distinct core-periphery topology across all protocols, indicative of highly centralized influence structures. This was substantiated by extreme economic inequality, with Gini coefficients of 0.91 for ProtoLend, 0.95 for ProtoSwap, and 0.89 for ProtoYield. Lorenz curves visually confirmed that a minuscule fraction of holders controls the vast majority of voting power. The Nakamoto coefficients were critically low, calculated at 8 for ProtoLend, 5 for ProtoSwap, and 11 for ProtoYield, exposing profound vulnerabilities to collusion and capture. In conclusion, our findings provide robust, triangulated evidence of a pervasive "decentralization illusion" within DeFi. Governance power is not distributed but is instead highly concentrated, replicating the plutocratic power dynamics of traditional finance. This concentration poses significant systemic risks and fundamentally challenges the core value proposition of the DeFi ecosystem.