Ramdhan Mahardika Nasyith
Universitas Pelita Harapan

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Legal Proof of Cybercrime: A Case Study of the Hacking of Bank Syariah Indonesia (BSI) Ramdhan Mahardika Nasyith; Marchello Putra Toding Palilli; Triswer Triswer; Russell Dante Wiranatakusumah; Telly Augustine
JIHAD : Jurnal Ilmu Hukum dan Administrasi Vol. 8 No. 2 (2026): JIHAD : Jurnal Ilmu Hukum dan Administrasi
Publisher : Lembaga Penelitian dan Pendidikan (LPP) Mandala

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | DOI: 10.58258/jihad.v8i2.10601

Abstract

This research aims to analyze legal evidence for cybercrime through a case study of the hacking of Bank Syariah Indonesia (BSI). The method used is normative legal research with a statutory, case, and conceptual approach. The results show that evidence in cybercrime relies heavily on digital evidence such as system logs, electronic data, and malware analyzed through digital forensics. The validity of electronic evidence has been recognized in Article 5 paragraph (1) and Article 44 of the Electronic Information and Transactions Law (UU ITE), and is supported by Article 235 paragraph (1) of the new Criminal Procedure Code (KUHAP). However, the evidentiary process faces various obstacles such as the anonymity of the perpetrator, the cross-border nature, and the vulnerability of digital evidence to manipulation. Therefore, it is necessary to increase the capacity of law enforcement officers, strengthen cybersecurity systems, and collaborate across institutions and internationally to support effective law enforcement against cybercrime.
Bank's Legal Responsibility in Detecting Shadow Controller-Related Beneficial Owner Wawan Zulmawan; Daniel Johnson Goenawan; Marchello Putra Toding Palilli; Ramdhan Mahardika Nasyith; Muhamad Naufal Rionatadiraja; Reyzel Yandika Lim; Triswer Triswer
JIHAD : Jurnal Ilmu Hukum dan Administrasi Vol. 8 No. 2 (2026): JIHAD : Jurnal Ilmu Hukum dan Administrasi
Publisher : Lembaga Penelitian dan Pendidikan (LPP) Mandala

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | DOI: 10.58258/jihad.v8i2.10612

Abstract

Transparency of legal entity ownership through reporting Beneficial Owner (BO) to the Ministry of Law and Human Rights is an important policy in preventing Money Laundering. However, the practice of shadow controllers, parties who de facto control a legal entity but are not reported as BO, remains a serious loophole. Banks as gatekeepers of the financial system have a strategic position to detect shadow controllers. This article aims to analyze the legal liability of banks for failing to detect shadow controllers, the sanctions that may be imposed, and the standard of proof for constructive knowledge. This research uses normative legal method with statutory and conceptual approaches, examining the Banking Law (Law No. 7/1992 as amended by Law No. 4/2023 on P2SK), Anti-Money Laundering Law No. 8/2010, OJK Regulation No. 8/2023 on APU-PPT, and Ministry of Law Regulations No. 2/2025 and No. 49/2025 on corporate BO. The results show that bank liability is fault-based, not strict liability. Banks that ignore indications of shadow controllers may be subject to administrative sanctions (reprimands to license revocation), civil sanctions (damages claims), and criminal sanctions. The standard of proof for constructive knowledge uses objective indicators such as suspicious transactions, complex ownership structures, and discrepancies between official documents and customer operational reality, measured by the reasonableness principle (prudent banker). This article recommends that banks act proactively by conducting independent verification beyond merely relying on the Ministry's BO reports, and strengthen early detection systems against shadow controllers.