State financial assistance to political parties raises questions about the limits of party autonomy and the forms of democratic accountability applicable to the use of public resources. This study examines how Indonesian law structures the relationship between state financial assistance, party autonomy, and democratic accountability, and how the regulatory framework can be directed toward strengthening intra-party democracy without expanding state intervention into internal party affairs. The study employs doctrinal legal research using statutory, conceptual, and case-law approaches. The primary legal materials include the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, the Political Parties Law, regulations governing state financial assistance to political parties, regulations of the Audit Board of Indonesia (BPK), official audit documents, and Constitutional Court Decision No. 194/PUU-XXIII/2025. The findings show that Indonesian law assigns democratic purposes to public funding through political education, cadre development, and the institutional strengthening of political parties. However, the mechanisms of accountability and enforcement remain more strongly oriented toward bookkeeping, compliance with designated uses, reporting, auditing, and administrative compliance. This creates an imbalance between the democratic purposes of public funding and the mechanisms through which its use is held accountable. This study proposes principles of democratic accountability that complement financial accountability by linking public funding to democratic functions, ensuring public transparency, maintaining an orientation toward party members and cadre development, addressing the concentration of benefits from public resources, and safeguarding party autonomy.