<![CDATA[This study is grounded in the background of the practice of party-led recall and the dominance of political parties in determining the political direction of the state, both of which give rise to contradictions with the principles of constitutionalism and the rule of law. Within the context of Indonesia’s open-list proportional electoral system, the recall mechanism and the absence of term limits for political party leadership constitute anomalies that undermine the principles of popular sovereignty and political accountability. This condition generates a constitutional paradox: political parties are recognized as the principal actors in the formation of public power pursuant to Article 6A paragraph (2) and Article 22E paragraph (3) of the UUD NRI 1945, yet they are not subjected to the same standards of public accountability imposed upon state institutions. The objective of this research is to analyze how the practice of recall and the authoritarian concentration of power within political parties may give rise to constitutional dysfunction and weaken the principles of democratic representation. This study employs a normative-juridical method and a comparative approach by examining Constitutional Court decisions as well as constitutional practices in several democratic states, including Germany and the Netherlands. The findings of this research demonstrate that political parties in Indonesia function not merely as electoral gatekeepers, but also as parliamentary executioners capable of removing duly elected legislators without public involvement. Such a condition produces the subordination of parliament to party elites and distorts the principle of political accountability, which in a democratic system ought to operate vertically between representatives and their constituents. Furthermore, the absence of mechanisms limiting the power of party leaders, coupled with the lack of obligations concerning internal transparency, reinforces the dominance of political parties as private entities exercising substantial public influence. Accordingly, the Constitutional Court should develop and adopt the public function doctrine in order to construe political parties as quasi-state actors subject to the principles of constitutional accountability and constitutional supremacy.]]>
