<![CDATA[This study examines the possibility of dissolving representative institutions within a presidential system, using parliamentary and semi-presidential practices as comparative references. It is motivated by the crisis of representation, marked by declining legislative quality, elite dominance, and eroding public trust. Two questions are addressed: (1) the grounds and mechanisms for dissolving representative institutions in parliamentary and semi-presidential systems, and (2) the prospects for such dissolution within a presidential system. Employing a normative juridical method with statutory, comparative, and conceptual approaches, this research not only describes existing legal norms but also critically evaluates the adequacy of constitutional design in responding to democratic crises, focusing on the relationship between political legitimacy, institutional design, and constitutional flexibility. The findings show that in parliamentary and semi-presidential systems, dissolution functions as an inherent corrective mechanism for resolving political deadlock and governmental crises, exercised through the authority of the head of state or government to dissolve parliament and return the mandate to the people through elections. By contrast, the presidential system's rigid separation of powers tends to preclude such mechanisms, potentially preserving dysfunctional institutions without effective correction an absence that may reflect constitutional stagnation rather than democratic stability. Accordingly, a limited and carefully regulated dissolution mechanism, introduced through referendum-based constitutional amendment or a democratic evaluation model grounded in popular sovereignty, warrants consideration to prevent representational distortion.]]>
