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From Intelligence Superiority to Decision-Making Superiority: Lessons from the Strait of Hormuz for the Strategic Security of the Strait of Malacca Joshua Insetyadi B; Muhammad Halkis; Agus Hasan Sulistiyono Reksoprodjo
International Journal of Education, Management, and Technology Vol 4 No 2 (2026): International Journal of Education, Management, and Technology
Publisher : Darul Yasin Al Sys

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | DOI: 10.58578/ijemt.v4i2.11870

Abstract

Although maritime chokepoints have received substantial attention in research on maritime security, energy security, and military power, limited scholarship has examined how multi-domain intelligence is converted into decision superiority and applied across distinct chokepoint environments. This study investigated the intelligence-to-decision mechanisms demonstrated in the Strait of Hormuz and assessed their conditional relevance to the strategic security of the Strait of Malacca. It employed a qualitative, theory-guided case study design integrating process tracing, structured, focused comparison, and source triangulation. The analysis covered the period from 2019 to August 2026, treating the Strait of Hormuz as the primary critical case and the Strait of Malacca as the application case. Data were drawn from peer-reviewed literature, official documents, international organizations, reputable news agencies, strategic and defense research institutions, and open-source intelligence. The findings reveal that maritime strategic effects emerge through an interconnected sequence comprising multi-domain intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), intelligence fusion, decision superiority, operational conversion, and strategic effects. Intelligence superiority alone does not guarantee strategic success; its effectiveness depends on converting integrated intelligence into timely, accurate, coordinated, and contextually appropriate decisions. The study contributes to maritime security scholarship by conceptualizing decision superiority as the mechanism linking intelligence architecture to strategic effects and demonstrating that lessons from the Strait of Hormuz should be transferred as adaptable mechanisms rather than replicated as military doctrines. For Indonesia, securing the Strait of Malacca requires prioritizing persistent ISR, multi-sensor intelligence fusion, interorganizational interoperability, rapid decision-making, and resilient surveillance instead of unilateral sea-denial strategies. These findings advance an intelligence-centric approach to maritime security and provide practical guidance for strengthening Indonesia’s maritime intelligence architecture while preserving freedom of navigation and regional cooperation. Further research should test the proposed intelligence-to-decision mechanism using additional primary sources and comparative evidence from other strategic maritime chokepoints.
Radicalization as a Pathway to Asymmetric Warfare: A Historical Study of the Abu Sayyaf Group in Southern Philippines Joshua Insetyadi B; Muhammad Halkis; Agus Hasan Sulistiyono Reksoprodjo
Journal of Multidisciplinary Science: MIKAILALSYS Vol 4 No 3 (2026): Journal of Multidisciplinary Science: MIKAILALSYS
Publisher : Darul Yasin Al Sys

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | DOI: 10.58578/mikailalsys.v4i3.11912

Abstract

The relationship between radicalization and asymmetric warfare remains insufficiently explained in historically grounded analyses of non-state armed groups. This study examines radicalization as a pathway to asymmetric warfare through a historical analysis of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) in the Southern Philippines. Employing a qualitative literature-based approach, the study draws on academic books, peer-reviewed journal articles, research reports, and official documents addressing the Moro conflict, ASG’s historical development, radicalization, terrorism, and asymmetric warfare. The data were examined through qualitative content analysis and historical process tracing, with Moghaddam’s Staircase to Terrorism serving as the primary analytical framework. The findings demonstrate that ASG’s development was embedded in a protracted historical context characterized by colonial legacies, political marginalization, socioeconomic disparities, land disputes, and perceived injustice. These conditions facilitated the emergence of radical narratives that were subsequently reinforced by Salafi-jihadist ideology, organizational recruitment, military training, and transnational connections. Radicalization also coincided with organizational and strategic transformation, as reflected in the increasing use of kidnapping, hostage-taking, bombing, ship hijacking, and criminal financing. Amid substantial military and organizational asymmetries between ASG and the Philippine state, these unconventional forms of violence provided the group with alternative means of confrontation. The study concludes that radicalization does not automatically produce asymmetric warfare; rather, it constitutes a pathway through which grievances are ideologically reframed, violence is legitimized, organizational capacity is developed, and unconventional strategies become viable for a weaker non-state actor. These findings contribute a historically grounded explanation of how radicalization processes can enable non-state armed groups to adopt asymmetric modes of warfare.