<![CDATA[This article examines Indonesia's political and diplomatic interests in full BRICS membership, with particular attention to two underexplored dimensions: status seeking as a middle power and the potential for norm entrepreneurship in global governance reform. Indonesia declared its intention to join BRICS at the Kazan summit in October 2024 and was formally announced as a full member on 6 January 2025. Rather than interpreting accession simply as alignment against the West, the article argues that Indonesia treats BRICS as an additional, non-exclusive arena through which to pursue reform of the United Nations, the international financial architecture, multilateral trade, climate finance, and the representation of the Global South. The study adopts an interpretive qualitative case-study design informed by middle-power theory, role theory, and status-seeking theory. It analyses the 2024 Kazan and 2025 Rio de Janeiro declarations, Indonesian government statements through June 2026, and author-generated semi-structured interview material. The findings indicate that Indonesia claims four interconnected roles: representative voice of developing countries, bridgebuilder between BRICS and other institutions, advocate of strategic diversification, and promoter of reformist multilateralism. However, textual congruence between Indonesian positions and BRICS declarations should not be treated as proof of causal influence. Indonesia's substantive impact remains constrained by consensus decision-making, internal heterogeneity, and the limited institutionalization of its own BRICS initiatives. The article develops the concept of status-to-influence conversion to explain how formal membership status may, or may not, become agenda-setting capacity and concrete diplomatic outcomes]]>
