<![CDATA[This study aims to reformulate the mechanism for forming Government Regulations in Lieu of Laws (Perppu) through a fast-track legislation approach grounded in deliberative democracy. It addresses the constitutional problems arising from broad presidential discretion, unclear parameters of “compelling urgency,” limited legislative oversight, and the absence of public participation in emergency lawmaking. The study contributes a normative model that seeks to reconcile the need for rapid governmental responses to urgent circumstances with democratic legitimacy, transparency, accountability, and public participation. Using normative legal research, the study applies a statute approach and a conceptual approach, examining the 1945 Constitution, Law Number 12 of 2011 concerning the Formation of Legislation, legal literature, and the theories of deliberative democracy developed by Jürgen Habermas and James S. Fishkin. The findings demonstrate that Perppu formation remains vulnerable to executive dominance, politicization, and weak participatory safeguards, despite constitutional and judicial limitations. The study further finds that fast-track legislation can accelerate emergency lawmaking while retaining checks and balances, provided it incorporates deliberative principles of influence, inclusion, open dialogue, access to information, and meaningful participation. The study concludes that reformulating Perppu formation through a selectively applicable fast-track procedure can strengthen its democratic legitimacy without undermining its responsiveness to compelling urgency. It recommends revising Law Number 12 of 2011 to establish clear eligibility criteria, procedural safeguards, public consultation mechanisms, transparency requirements, and stronger parliamentary oversight.]]>
