<![CDATA[This article aims to analyze judicial inconsistency in applying Article 116(f) of the Compilation of Islamic Law (Kompilasi Hukum Islam/KHI) through a comparative legal analysis of decisions rendered by the Religious Court of Malang Regency, identify the factors contributing to inconsistent judicial reasoning, and examine their implications for legal certainty and the protection of women's post-divorce rights. Article 116(f) of the Compilation of Islamic Law constitutes the principal legal basis for wife-initiated divorce (cerai gugat) before the Indonesian Religious Courts. However, the provision employs open-textured legal concepts concerning continuous disputes and the absence of any reasonable prospect of reconciliation without providing objective legal standards to guide judicial interpretation. This normative ambiguity has resulted in inconsistent evidentiary assessments, judicial reasoning, and legal consequences in comparable divorce cases, particularly regarding women's post-divorce financial rights. This research employed normative legal research using statutory and case approaches with a descriptive-analytical specification. Primary legal materials consisted of relevant legislation and three selected decisions of the Religious Court of Malang Regency, while secondary legal materials comprised books, peer-reviewed journal articles, and previous legal studies. Legal materials were collected through library research and document analysis and analyzed qualitatively through statutory interpretation, comparative analysis of the judgments' ratio decidendi, and deductive legal reasoning. The findings demonstrate that judicial inconsistency does not originate from Article 116(f) itself but from the inconsistent exercise of judicial discretion in evaluating marital breakdown, assessing reconciliation prospects, and determining women's post-divorce financial rights through ex officio authority. This article concludes that the absence of uniform interpretative standards weakens legal certainty and results in unequal legal protection in comparable divorce cases. The novelty of this research lies in demonstrating that judicial inconsistency under Article 116(f) primarily stems from the inconsistent exercise of judicial discretion within the same Religious Court and in proposing uniform interpretative standards to strengthen judicial consistency, legal certainty, and substantive justice in the adjudication of Islamic family law disputes.]]>
