<![CDATA[This study investigates the effects of leverage, financial distress, and earnings management on tax avoidance, and examines whether independent commissioners moderate these relationships. The study is motivated by an anomaly in which the property and real estate sector continues to contribute positively to economic growth while its tax contribution does not increase proportionally, raising questions about the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms in constraining managerial opportunism under information asymmetry. Using panel data from property and real estate companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange during 2019–2022, the analysis employs a quantitative approach based on secondary data from annual reports and financial statements. The results indicate that leverage has a negative and significant effect on tax avoidance, while financial distress does not show a significant relationship. Earnings management is also found to be significantly associated with tax avoidance. Furthermore, the moderation analysis reveals that independent commissioners weaken the relationship between financial distress and tax avoidance, but do not moderate the effects of leverage or earnings management. These findings extend Agency Theory by demonstrating that governance mechanisms constrain tax-related opportunistic behavior only under conditions of financial pressure, highlighting the conditional role of independent commissioners in corporate tax decisions.]]>
