<![CDATA[Human rights constitute one of the fundamental foundations of the rule of law, placing the protection of fundamental rights as an essential element in the administration of the state. Within the human rights protection framework, certain rights possess a special character because they may not be diminished under any circumstances. The problem arises when the protection of such rights intersects with the state's authority to impose limitations on human rights, particularly under circumstances that may justify restrictions or derogation. This situation raises questions concerning the scope of protection afforded to non-derogable rights and the relationship between the principle of non-derogable rights and the state's authority to limit human rights. This research employs a normative legal research method using statutory, conceptual, and comparative approaches. This study argues that non-derogable rights must be recognized as a category of rights receiving special constitutional protection and, therefore, cannot be subjected to reduction through general limitation powers. The findings demonstrate that a clear distinction between limitation and derogation is essential in determining the scope of protection afforded to non-derogable rights. This distinction further affirms that the state's authority to restrict human rights remains subject to legal boundaries and cannot be exercised to diminish rights that are fundamentally non-derogable.]]>
