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All Journal Indonesian Anti Corruption Studies
Ivan Kurniawan
Universitas Pamulang

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Political Party Financing and Corruption Risks in Indonesia: Rethinking Transparency and Accountability in Electoral Democracy Ivan Kurniawan
Indonesian Anti Corruption Studies Vol. 3 No. 1 (2026): March, 2026
Publisher : COLLEGIUM JUSTICIA INDONESIA

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | DOI: 10.65815/2vwvyd51

Abstract

Political party financing represents a persistent governance challenge because political organizations require financial resources to operate while remaining vulnerable to illicit contributions, conflicts of interest, and political corruption. This article examines the relationship between party financing and corruption risks in Indonesia. Using normative juridical and institutional analysis, the study evaluates political party finance regulation, disclosure requirements, public subsidies, private contributions, and enforcement mechanisms. The article argues that limited transparency concerning the sources and use of party funds may create opportunities for political actors to exchange policy influence for financial benefits. The study proposes a party-finance accountability framework based on comprehensive disclosure, independent auditing, standardized reporting, strengthened public financing, and effective sanctions for violations. Particular attention is given to the role of public funding in reducing parties' dependence on private financial interests while maintaining democratic accountability. The article concludes that political finance reform should be treated as a core component of anti-corruption policy because electoral integrity and corruption prevention are closely interconnected. Strengthening transparency in political financing would improve public trust and reduce structural incentives for illicit political funding.
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