<![CDATA[This study presents an overview and analysis of the ideal interpretation of "deception" as a basis for annulling arbitral awards. The interpretation of "deception" in Article 70 of Law Number 30 of 1999 on Arbitration and Alternative Dispute Resolution, and its application in Indonesian judicial practice, should not be construed narrowly. The central issue examined is the broad interpretation of this term and the lack of uniformity among judges in qualifying acts as trickery for the annulment of arbitral awards. Existing scholarship has not specifically addressed the interpretation of "deception," instead focusing more generally on the annulment of arbitral awards. This research adopts a normative juridical method, employing both statutory and case law approaches. Legal materials include primary sources, such as arbitration statutes and Constitutional Court decisions related to "deception," as well as secondary sources, including books and journals on arbitration. The analysis utilizes deductive and inductive reasoning to develop prescriptive arguments. The findings demonstrate that "deception" functions as an open norm, which in practice is interpreted not only as classical fraud but also as manipulation of facts, manipulation of the trial process, and deviations in the application of law by arbitrators that influence the issuance of arbitral awards. Judicial interpretations of this term are case-specific and lack a uniform standard, resulting in potential legal uncertainty. Although a broad interpretation is necessary to safeguard the integrity of the arbitration process from fraudulent practices, it may also compromise the principle of finality in arbitral awards.]]>
