The entry into force of the National Criminal Code on 2 January 2026 reshaped the regulatory architecture of terrorism offences: Articles 6 and 7 of the Counter-Terrorism Law were repealed and their function transferred to Articles 600 and 601 of the Code, while Article 9, Article 13(c), and Article 15 of that law remain in force, and Law Number 1 of 2026 on Criminal Adjustment together with Supreme Court Regulation Number 2 of 2026 on Sentencing Guidelines for Certain Terrorism Offences add further normative layers. This study aims to explain the relative position of those four instruments in determining punishment and to formulate how judges may assess culpability, harm, and offender circumstances consistently without dissolving the individualisation of punishment. The method employed is normative legal research using statutory, conceptual, and comparative approaches, the latter drawing on the sentencing guidelines of England and Wales; legal materials were collected through literature study and analysed descriptively and prescriptively in six sequential stages, from the identification of the legal issues to the construction of the model. The findings show that the guidelines operate accessorily and depend on proof of an offence exhaustively listed within their scope rather than on a general labelling of a case as terrorism, and that they alter neither the elements of the offence nor the statutory sentencing range. The study also identifies a coherence problem in Article 15, which still refers to repealed provisions. Its contribution is a five-layer audit model of sentencing reasoning that keeps judicial discretion alive yet open to argumentative scrutiny.