Riztiar Arinta
Universitas Borobudur, Jakarta, Indonesia

Published : 2 Documents Claim Missing Document
Claim Missing Document
Check
Articles

Found 2 Documents
Search

A New Paradigm for Judicial Scrutiny of Tax Discretion in Indonesia: Re-evaluating the 'Element of Justice' through the Substance Over Form Doctrine Following SEMA 02/2024 Riztiar Arinta; Binsar Jon Vic
Jurnal Greenation Sosial dan Politik Vol. 3 No. 4 (2025): Jurnal Greenation Sosial dan Politik (November 2025 - Januari 2026)
Publisher : Greenation Publisher

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | DOI: 10.38035/jgsp.v3i4.552

Abstract

This study undertakes a comprehensive examination of the judicial review framework governing the discretionary authority of Indonesia's Director General of Taxes (DGT), as conferred by Article 36(1)(b) of the General Tax Provisions and Procedures Law (UU KUP), particularly in the wake of Supreme Court Circular No. 02 of 2024 (SEMA 02/2024). A central legal inquiry is addressed: does the issuance of SEMA 02/2024 insulate this discretionary power from judicial oversight, effectively rendering it an absolute authority? Employing a normative legal research methodology, this paper contends that the General Principles of Good Governance (AUPB) are an unsuitable standard for evaluating such discretion due to their inherent abstraction when applied to concrete tax disputes. In their place, this analysis posits that a foundational doctrine of tax law—substance over form—offers the most pertinent and effective test for the "element of justice" mandated by the statute. The core argument advanced is that Article 36(1)(b) does not grant unfettered discretion but rather a bound authority (gebonden discretie), intended to uphold material truth in circumstances where formal procedural avenues, such as time-barred objections, are no longer available. Consequently, SEMA 02/2024 does not abolish judicial review but fundamentally transforms it. The Tax Court's role shifts from adjudicating the substance of a tax assessment to scrutinizing the legality and reasonableness of the DGT's application of the substance over form principle in its decision-making process. This thesis is corroborated by empirical data from post-SEMA judicial rulings, which reveal continued and active judicial oversight concerning the legality of discretionary applications. The paper concludes with a recommendation for the DGT to formulate internal guidelines predicated on the substance over form principle to bolster legal certainty and administrative accountability.
Clemency Authority Versus Judicial Review: The Jurisdictional Conflict of Absolute Discretion under Article 36(1)(a) of the General Provisions and Tax Procedures Law Riztiar Arinta; Richard
Greenation International Journal of Law and Social Sciences Vol. 3 No. 3 (2025): (GIJLSS) Greenation International Journal of Law and Social Sciences (September
Publisher : Greenation Research

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | DOI: 10.38035/gijlss.v3i3.578

Abstract

This scholarly work explores the ongoing juridical ambiguity and adjudicative divergence stemming from Article 36(1)(a) within the General Tax Provisions and Procedures Law (KUP Law), which grants the Director General of Taxes (DGT) power to mitigate or nullify fiscal penalties. The central argument positions this competence beyond routine administrative discretion amenable to judicial control, characterizing it instead as executive clemency—an absolute, extra-judicial capacity rooted in equitable and compassionate principles. Employing a normative-juridical methodology combining historical reconstruction, conceptual analysis, and case examination, this work traces the authority's origins to the colonial Ordonansi Kepatutan (Ordinance of Propriety), originally designed as a substantive justice mechanism operating outside formal adjudicative processes. Critical evaluation of Tax Court Decision No. PUT-004535.99.2024.PP.M IXA demonstrates how the tribunal's substantive examination fundamentally misconstrued the DGT's prerogative character, transforming mercy applications into actionable disputes—a categorization error obscuring executive-judicial boundaries. Research outcomes establish that Article 36(1)(a) determinations lie beyond judicial cognizance, falling outside the Tax Court's legitimate jurisdictional scope. Addressing this theoretical confusion requires dual policy interventions: Supreme Court Circular (SEMA) issuance directing judges toward inadmissibility declarations for such proceedings, coupled with KUP Law statutory revision explicitly recognizing these administrative decisions' definitive and conclusive character.