<![CDATA[This scholarly work explores the ongoing juridical ambiguity and adjudicative divergence stemming from Article 36(1)(a) within the General Tax Provisions and Procedures Law (KUP Law), which grants the Director General of Taxes (DGT) power to mitigate or nullify fiscal penalties. The central argument positions this competence beyond routine administrative discretion amenable to judicial control, characterizing it instead as executive clemency—an absolute, extra-judicial capacity rooted in equitable and compassionate principles. Employing a normative-juridical methodology combining historical reconstruction, conceptual analysis, and case examination, this work traces the authority's origins to the colonial Ordonansi Kepatutan (Ordinance of Propriety), originally designed as a substantive justice mechanism operating outside formal adjudicative processes. Critical evaluation of Tax Court Decision No. PUT-004535.99.2024.PP.M IXA demonstrates how the tribunal's substantive examination fundamentally misconstrued the DGT's prerogative character, transforming mercy applications into actionable disputes—a categorization error obscuring executive-judicial boundaries. Research outcomes establish that Article 36(1)(a) determinations lie beyond judicial cognizance, falling outside the Tax Court's legitimate jurisdictional scope. Addressing this theoretical confusion requires dual policy interventions: Supreme Court Circular (SEMA) issuance directing judges toward inadmissibility declarations for such proceedings, coupled with KUP Law statutory revision explicitly recognizing these administrative decisions' definitive and conclusive character.]]>
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