<![CDATA[Constitutional Court decisions are final and binding, yet their effectiveness depends not only on their normative authority but also on the compliance of the addressees responsible for implementing their legal consequences. The issue becomes more complex when decisions are non self executing and require legislative amendments by the House of Representatives and the President. This study analyzes the problems of constitutional compliance in lawmaking and formulates an institutional model for strengthening compliance within Indonesia’s legislative system. It applies normative legal research using statutory, case, and conceptual approaches. The analysis focuses on Constitutional Court Decisions No. 91/PUU XVIII/2020, No. 116/PUU XXI/2023, No. 135/PUU XXII/2024, and the subsequent Decision No. 37/PUU XXIV/2026. The study identifies three principal gaps: an institutional gap caused by the absence of an integrated procedure linking constitutional judgments to the legislative agenda, a temporal gap arising from inconsistent time limits for follow up, and a substantive gap because legislators are not required to demonstrate conformity between implementing legislation and the judgment’s operative order and ratio decidendi. This article proposes an Institutionalized Constitutional Compliance Model consisting of a Constitutional Decision Register, Legislative Compliance Trigger, Constitutional Compliance Deadline, Constitutional Compliance Statement, and Constitutional Compliance Review. The model seeks to transform compliance from dependence on political willingness into an institutional and legal obligation while preserving the constitutionally legitimate policy space of lawmakers.]]>
