<![CDATA[The use of farmland as collateral has become a quick financing alternative for rural communities in Majene Regency that lack access to formal financial institutions. This practice is increasingly prevalent and raises legal concerns when the collateral’s value is indexed to fluctuations in the gold price. This study aims to examine how the community implements the farmland pawn scheme linked to gold and to evaluate its compliance with Islamic economic law, particularly regarding elements of gharar, riba, and the principle of justice. This research offers a critical analysis of an agricultural pawn mechanism indexed to gold-an area seldom addressed in Islamic economic law scholarship-by assessing its legal inconsistencies and proposing a reconstructed contract model. A descriptive-qualitative design was employed using a normative-theological approach, supported by field interviews and an extensive literature review to analyse the contractual structure and its legal implications. The study finds indications of riba qardh due to additional repayment without a productive basis, and gharar fakhisy arising from uncertainty about the total debt valuation. These conditions conflict with the justice principle in maqashid sharia, as pawnholders obtain double benefits while pawn-givers incur double losses. The research proposes reconstructing the Rahn contract by applying qardh hasan without additional charges and incorporating a profit-sharing scheme for farmland yields.]]>
