<![CDATA[ABSTRACT: State financial assistance to political parties creates a complex set of relationships. On one hand, political parties emerge from the freedom of association and possess the autonomy to manage their own organizations. On the other hand, when funding is derived from the state or regional budget (APBN/APBD), the use of such funds must be accountable to the public. This article examines how Indonesian law positions state assistance—balancing the autonomy of political parties with the demands for accountability—and explores how these regulations can strengthen internal democracy without devolving into excessive state intervention. The research employs a normative approach, analyzing regulations concerning political parties and financial assistance, audit provisions by the Supreme Audit Agency (BPK), audit reports, and Constitutional Court Decision Number 194/PUU-XXIII/2025. The findings indicate that while the law provides a democratic orientation for public funding—specifically for political education, cadre development, and institutional strengthening—the existing accountability mechanisms remain primarily focused on bookkeeping, expenditure compliance, reporting, and auditing. Consequently, financial reports that meet regulatory requirements do not, in themselves, guarantee that public funds are fostering a healthier internal democracy. This article proposes five principles of democratic accountability to complement financial accountability: linking the use of funds to the democratic functions of the party; ensuring transparent and accessible information; prioritizing party members and cadre-building processes; preventing the concentration of benefits; and safeguarding the autonomy of political parties.]]>
