<![CDATA[This study examines how the Fāṭimiyah Dynasty, an Ismaili Shia political power, established and maintained political and ideological hegemony in Sunni-majority Egypt between 969 - 1171 AD. It addresses the historical paradox of how a religious minority built a durable political order in a society where Sunni institutions were already deeply entrenched. Using a historical-critical approach, the study analyzes primary sources, including al-Maqrīzī's al-Mawāʿiẓ wa al-Iʿtibār, Ibn al-Athīr's chronicles, and Qāḍī al-Nuʿmān's Daʿāʾim al-Islām, supported by relevant modern scholarship. The data were examined through historical criticism, interpretation, and Gramscian discourse analysis to identify mechanisms of coercion, consent formation, ideological production, organic intellectuals, and historical bloc formation. The findings show that Fatimid hegemony was built through three interconnected strategies. First, political hegemony was secured through military authority, diplomatic accommodation, administrative consolidation, and alliances with local elites. Second, ideological hegemony was produced through al-Azhar, networks of daʿī, religious texts, and symbolic practices that converted political authority into religious legitimacy. Third, Fatimid authority was continuously negotiated through Sunni resistance, accommodation, and counter-hegemonic responses. The study argues that Fatimid rule rested not on coercion alone but on ideological consent and institutional legitimacy. From a Gramscian perspective, the Fāṭimiyah case demonstrates how minority groups can construct hegemony by integrating coercion, consent, intellectual leadership, and symbolic power. Nevertheless, the dynasty's decline shows that hegemonic systems become vulnerable when historical blocs fragment, ideological institutions weaken, and social consent erodes.]]>
