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All Journal Jurnal Titra Matrik: Jurnal Manajemen, Strategi Bisnis, Dan Kewirausahaan
Indriati Njoto Bisono
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Decision Sciences, Operations Research & Management Economics, Econometrics & Finance Industrial & Manufacturing Engineering

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Efisiensi Mesin Diesel Pada Tambak Udang Dengan Eksperimen Desain Nicholas Handoko; Indriati Njoto Bisono
Jurnal Titra Vol 3, No 2 (2015)
Publisher : Jurnal Titra

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | Full PDF (305.147 KB)

Abstract

The operational cost to operate paddle wheel with generator at PT X is very high; for daily shrimp cultivation each farm need 14 paddle wheels that use 24 hours electricity from the generators. Thus an experiment was conducted to minimize the number of paddle wheels operated. Naturally, pond water contains phytoplankton that carries photosyntesis to produce oxygen at noon. Photosyntesis processes need carbon dioxide to turn to oxygen at noon, on the other hand paddle wheel also need the carbon dioxide in the pond and turn it into oxygen. Thus the two are conflicted. Turning off the paddle wheels at noon then increase the photosynthesis process, make it more effective. The experiment results show that turning off paddle wheel at noon did not affect oxygen supply and the average weight of the shrimps.
INCENTIVE MECHANISM FOR QUALITY INSPECTION: A LINEAR PROGRAMMING APPROACH I Nyoman Sutapa; I Gede Riana; Magdalena Wullur; Indriati Njoto Bisono
MATRIK: JURNAL MANAJEMEN, STRATEGI BISNIS, DAN KEWIRAUSAHAAN Vol. 19 No. 2 (2025)
Publisher : Faculty of Economics and Business Udayana University

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | DOI: 10.24843/MATRIK:JMBK.2025.v19.i02.p05

Abstract

This study develops an incentive mechanism model for outsourced personnel in product quality inspection, based on a principal-agent relationship. The core challenge lies in misaligned incentives, where agents often prioritize output volume over quality. By integrating Mechanism Design Theory (MDT) and Linear Programming (LP), our model aligns the principal's objective of minimizing defective products with the agent's utility maximization, subject to Incentive Compatibility and Individual Rationality constraints. Our analysis reveals that the optimal incentive structure combines a basic wage with a performance-based bonus. The optimal effort level of outsourced personnel increases with both rising losses due to defective products and enhanced detection effort effectiveness. The model also shows that optimal inspection allocation should be assigned to personnel with higher capabilities, especially for high-risk products. This research provides a theoretical contribution by integrating MDT and LP for incentive design and offers practical implications for improving product quality through a measurable incentive framework.
Co-Authors I Gede Riana I Nyoman Sutapa Magdalena Wullur Nicholas Handoko