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Financial and Non-Financial Incentive Mechanisms in ISPO Certification: A Management Control Systems Perspective Antonius Grivaldi Sondakh; Lili Safrida; Diah Fitriaty; Muhammad Yasin
Invoice : Jurnal Ilmu Akuntansi Vol. 8 No. 1 (2026): March 2026
Publisher : Universitas Muhammadiyah Makassar

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | DOI: 10.26618/b85nj883

Abstract

Sustainability certification has become a key governance instrument for aligning dispersed actors with environmental and regulatory objectives, particularly in agricultural value chains. However, the effectiveness of incentive mechanisms designed to support certification adoption remains insufficiently understood, especially when different types of incentives are evaluated within an integrated framework. Drawing on a management control systems (MCS) perspective, this study examines the comparative effects of financial, non-financial, and combination incentives on independent smallholders’ perceived effectiveness of support for Indonesian Sustainable Palm Oil (ISPO) certification. This study adopts a quantitative explanatory approach using survey data collected from 143 oil palm smallholders in South Kalimantan, Indonesia. Data were analyzed using Partial Least Squares Structural Equation Modeling (PLS-SEM) to assess the relationships between incentive mechanisms and perceived effectiveness. The findings reveal that all three types of incentives have a positive and statistically significant influence. However, non-financial incentives demonstrate the strongest effect (β = 0.352, p < 0.001), followed by financial incentives (β = 0.261, p < 0.001), while combination incentives show a weaker effect (β = 0.165, p < 0.05). These results suggest that enabling controls, such as training, market access facilitation, and institutional recognition, play a more critical role than outcome-based financial incentives in shaping perceived effectiveness. Furthermore, the findings challenge the assumption of automatic complementarity in combined incentive designs, indicating that integration does not necessarily enhance effectiveness in fragmented institutional contexts. This study contributes to management accounting literature by extending the concept of control packages to extra-organizational sustainability governance and highlights the conditional nature of incentive complementarity. The findings offer important implications for designing more coherent and effective sustainability-oriented policy interventions in developing economies.
PARADOKS NORMA SOSIAL DALAM KEPATUHAN SERTIFIKASI ISPO: BUKTI DARI AKUNTANSI KEPERILAKUAN Antonius Grivaldi Sondakh; Lili Safrida
BALANCE: Jurnal Akuntansi, Auditing dan Keuangan Vol. 23 No. 1 (2026): BALANCE: Jurnal Akuntansi, Auditing dan Keuangan
Publisher : Fakultas Ekonomi dan Bisnis Universitas Katolik Indonesia Atma Jaya

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | DOI: 10.25170/balance.v23i1.7839

Abstract

This study challenges the foundational assumption in behavioral accounting that social norms promote compliance. It investigates a paradoxical possibility: under certain conditions, social norms may inhibit compliance. Drawing on the theory of planned behavior, this research examines how social norms, conservation beliefs, and self-efficacy influence smallholders' intention to adopt Indonesian Sustainable Palm Oil (ISPO) certification. Survey data from 143 smallholders in South Kalimantan were analyzed using Partial Least Squares Structural Equation Modeling (PLS-SEM). The findings reveal a social norms paradox: perceived community pressure negatively influences certification intention. Conservation beliefs also exhibit a negative effect, indicating value-control misalignment when certification is perceived as disconnected from substantive outcomes. In contrast, self-efficacy positively influences intention. This study identifies boundary conditions for subjective norms and introduces the concept of value-control misalignment to explain resistance among environmentally committed actors.