Imam Abdurrosyid
Unknown Affiliation

Published : 2 Documents Claim Missing Document
Claim Missing Document
Check
Articles

Found 2 Documents
Search

SAFETY INTEGRITY LEVEL ASSESSMENT AT URANIUM EVAPORATOR AND DEPOSITION VESSEL IN NON NUCLEAR REACTOR INSTALLATIONS Putra Oktavianto; Anis Noor Kundari; Ade Saputra; Imam Abdurrosyid; Munisatun Sholikhah; Andri Saputra
Urania: Jurnal Ilmiah Daur Bahan Bakar Nuklir Vol. 29 No. 1 (2023): Urania : Jurnal Ilmiah Daur Bahan Bakar Nuklir
Publisher : Badan Riset dan Inovasi Nasional

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | DOI: 10.17146/urania.2023.29.1.6986

Abstract

The operation of non-reactor nuclear installations that use nuclear material in the process must be ensured safely during the process. One of the assessments of the safety level of the protection system that has been owned by the installation is using the Safety Integrity Level (SIL) which assesses the safety level of the protection system based on the value of the risk reduction factor that the protection system can achieve. The uranium evaporator and deposition vessel at the Experimental Fuel Element Installation (EFEI) is one of the installations that uses nuclear material in the process so it is necessary to assess the SIL of these 2 vessels. The piping and instrumentation diagram (P&ID) is used to determine the SIL value and Safety Instrumented System (SIS) component are installed in evaporator and deposition vessel. Maintenance data and OREDA (Offshore Reliability Data) are used to determine the failure rate. After knowing and determining the installed SIS components, then determining the architecture vote of the Safety Instrumented Function (SIF) based on the P&ID diagram, so that it can be known that the installed SIS uses vote 1oo1, 1oo2, 1oo3, or the appropriate vote. The installed SIF architecture vote will determine the equation used to calculate the Probability Failure on Demand (PFD). The total PFD obtained is adjusted to the SIL table to find out what SIL level the installed protection system is at. The value of the safety level of the protection system with SIL assessment in the evaporator vessel obtained 2 protection systems with SIL values of level 2 all and in the deposition vessel obtained 2 protection systems with SIL values of level 1 and level 2. The SIL value in the evaporator and deposition vessel analyzed has not reached level 3 or 4, so it is necessary to add SIF to the SIS protection system to increase the SIL value until the SIL value is obtained between level 3 or 4 because safety in the operation of non-reactor nuclear installations is absolute.
STUDI KELAYAKAN YELLOWCAKE HASIL SAMPING PETROKIMIA GRESIK SEBAGAI BAHAN BAKU PROSES PEMURNIAN DAN KONVERSI DI FASILITAS PILOT CONVERSION PLANT Ade Saputra; Erilia Yusnitha; Imam Abdurrosyid; Ratih Langenati
Urania: Jurnal Ilmiah Daur Bahan Bakar Nuklir Vol. 27 No. 2 (2021): Urania : Jurnal Ilmiah Daur Bahan Bakar Nuklir
Publisher : Badan Riset dan Inovasi Nasional

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | DOI: 10.17146/urania.2021.27.2.6424

Abstract

The Pilot Conversion Plant (PCP) facility has been successfully used for the purification and conversion of commercial yellowcake from Cogema – France. Thus, to support self-reliance of the nation, an assessment of the purification and conversion process of domestic yellowcake was carried out. One of domestic sources of yellowcake is the by-product of a process carried out at Petrokimia, Gresik. This study was carried out by comparing the characteristics of the chemical and physical properties of Petrokimia's yellowcake to those of Cogema's yellowcake which has been used at the PCP. Primary information was obtained from analysis results while secondary information was obtained from related literatures. The information obtained is also used to determine the process parameters needed by the PCP for the purification and conversion process. The results of this study show that Petrokimia's yellowcake is suitable to be used as the feed of purification and conversion process at the PCP facility. In addition, Petrokimia's yellowcake is easier to handle although requires more nitric acid than Cogema yellowcake dissolution. The parameters values of Petrokimia's yellowcake purification and conversion process that have been obtained include dissolution of yellowcake, purification of uranyl nitrate, uranyl nitrate concentrating, precipitation of uranyl nitrate into ammonium diuranate (ADU), drying of ADU powder, calcination of ADU into U3O8 powder and reduction of U3O8 powder into UO2 powder, which are no different from the parameters values for Cogema's yellowcake processing.