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Fattah, Galuh Nur
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Religion

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Ketiadaan Mutlak dalam Buddhisme Zen Perspektif Pemikiran Nishida Kitarō dan Korelasinya dengan Realitas Fattah, Galuh Nur; Tangrestu, Venessya
Media: Jurnal Filsafat dan Teologi Vol. 5 No. 1 (2024): Februari 2024
Publisher : Sekolah Tinggi Filsafat Seminari Pineleng

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | DOI: 10.53396/media.v5i1.267

Abstract

This essay discusses Nishida Kitarō's view of absolute nothingness, a concept influenced by the tradition of Zen Buddhism. Methodologically, it is designed as philosophical hermeneutics and aims to provide a new perspective in the study of philosophy. Nishida's thinking is based on the tradition of Western philosophical thought, especially Hegel, Kant, and Heidegger. However, in its development, Nishida created a new philosophical construction that attempted to criticize the Western philosophical tradition. This paper shows that Nishida Kitarō internalized Zen Buddhism into his philosophy. Nishida brings together Zen Buddhism as a philosophical thought with various types of thought and figures in the Western philosophical tradition. Zettai mu or absolute nothingness is at the heart of all of Nishida's metaphysical edifice. This absolute nothingness is built on a spatial logic that allows contact between the subject and the object. Nishida understands the concept of absolute nothingness in three phenomenologies of personal identity. These three stages lead to the contradiction of absolute self-identity. These findings can contribute to forming new enlightenment in freeing oneself from false perceptions of reality and wrong views.
A Critical Comparison between Nāma-Rūpa and Cartesian Dualism: Theravāda Buddhist Anattā as a Critique of Descartes’ Cogito Ergo Sum Fattah, Galuh Nur; Medhacitto, Tri Saputra; Nanda, Gonalagoda
Media: Jurnal Filsafat dan Teologi Vol. 5 No. 2 (2024): September 2024
Publisher : Sekolah Tinggi Filsafat Seminari Pineleng

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | DOI: 10.53396/media.v5i2.409

Abstract

This research article aims to present a critical study on the comparison between the concepts of nāma-rūpa and Cartesian dualism. Nāma-rūpa is a human metaphysical and epistemological concept in Theravāda Buddhism that divides the human self into non-material (nāma) and material (rūpa) aspects. Cartesian dualism, on the other hand, is a human metaphysical concept proposed by René Descartes that also separates the aspects of human self-formation into non-material (res cogitans) and material (res extensa) components. This research article was conducted using the critical comparison method. Despite the same dualistic perspective, this study found that there are significant differences between these two metaphysical concepts. In the context of nāma-rūpa, it is found that the material and non-material aspects of human substance are in a constant state of change due to the influence of Tiḷakkhaṇa (Three Universal Characteristics or Laws) in Theravāda Buddhism. These characteristics or laws encompass Aniccā (Impermanence), Dukkhā (Suffering), and Anattā (Not Self). Therefore, it is impossible to locate the "I" or "self" as understood in Cartesian dualism, which posits the cogito (the "I who thinks") as something that truly exists. 
Co-Authors Nanda, Gonalagoda Tangrestu, Venessya Tri Saputra Medhācitto