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All Journal Qisthosia Prosiding Seminar Hukum Aktual Fakultas Hukum Universitas Islam Indonesia
Muhammad Taufiq Firdaus
Unknown Affiliation
Religion Humanities Environmental Science Law, Crime, Criminology & Criminal Justice Social Sciences

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Teori State Auxiliary Bodies dan Trigger Mechanism Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi dalam Penanganan Korupsi di Daerah Muhammad Taufiq Firdaus
QISTHOSIA : Jurnal Syariah dan Hukum Vol. 4 No. 2 (2023)
Publisher : Sekolah Tinggi Agama Islam Negeri Majene

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | DOI: 10.46870/jhki.v4i2.750

Abstract

Indonesia's anti-corruption institution, namely the Corruption Eradication Commit-tee (KPK), as a state auxiliary body (supporting state institution) has various prob-lems. The KPK is only based in Jakarta and is connected centrally. This condition increases the freedom for regional officials to commit criminal acts of corruption especially in the regions. The KPK as a trigger mechanism for the Prosecutor's Of-fice and the Police is still not effective in handling corruption in the regions. This research is qualitative research with exploratory nature with juridical-normative method. The purpose of this study is to explore more about the theory of state auxil-iary bodies, especially the design of the KPK in handling corruption in the regions, as well as knowing the role of the KPK as a trigger mechanism together with the police and prosecutors in handling and eradicating corruption in the regions. The finding in this research contained that the trigger mechanism function by the Corrup-tion Eradication Commission is necessary. The centralized position of the KPK is less effective in handling corruption in the regions. Several factors in the KPK's in-effective handling of corruption in the regions include; Firstly, the KPK's work area is too broad, relying solely on the KPK's centralized position, resulting in the KPK being overwhelmed several times in handling cases in the regions. Second, the Cor-ruption Eradication Commission's infrastructure is very limited, starting from human resources to the KPK's very limited budget, which does not allow the KPK to handle cases in all regions in Indonesia. Third, the Corruption Eradication Commission needs KPK representatives in several regions to support handling corruption in the regions.
Lumpuhnya Pengawasan DPR dan Bangkitnya Rezim Competitive Authoritarian Pasca Pemilu 2024 Muhammad Taufiq Firdaus; Raudatul Jannah
Prosiding Seminar Hukum Aktual Fakultas Hukum Universitas Islam Indonesia Vol. 4 No. 4 JULI 2026
Publisher : Fakultas Hukum Universitas Islam Indonesia

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Abstract

This article analyzes the deepening trajectory of competitive authoritarianism in Indonesia following the 2024 election, emphasizing the systematic erosion of checks and balances through three interrelated patterns of power consolidation. First, the formation of an oversized legislative coalition has transformed the parliament into an extension of the executive, eliminating effective opposition and reducing oversight mechanisms to political formalities. Second, the regime’s increasing control over media, digital space, and civil society reflects a shift toward digital authoritarianism, where narrative management, institutionalized disinformation, and selective repression create an uneven playing field while maintaining the façade of democratic procedures. Third, the militarization of civilian governance, marked by the strategic placement of military elites in key ministries and the expansion of territorial command structures, signals a progressive blurring of boundaries between civilian authority and military influence. Using a qualitative-descriptive method supported by process tracing, this study demonstrates that Indonesia’s democratic backsliding is neither incidental nor temporary, but structurally produced through legal engineering, patronage-based co-optation, and normalization of executive hegemony. The findings highlight how democratic institutions persist formally but lose substantive autonomy, functioning primarily to legitimize rather than limit state power. The post-2024 configuration thus embodies a unitary executive model strengthened by media dominance, hegemonic coalition-building, and securitization of governance. This article argues that Indonesia is entering a critical juncture: without institutional reform and reinvigoration of civic resistance, competitive authoritarianism may harden into a new authoritarian order cloaked in democratic rituals.
Co-Authors Raudatul Jannah