Articles
<![CDATA[DIVIDEND POLICY IN AUSTRALIA ]]>
<![CDATA[Lukas Setia Atmaja]]>
<![CDATA[ Jurnal Keuangan dan Perbankan Vol 13, No 2 (2009): May 2009 ]]>
Publisher : <![CDATA[University of Merdeka Malang ]]>
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DOI: 10.26905/jkdp.v13i2.934
<![CDATA[This study examined the determinants of dividends in an environment where taxwas supposedly a main reason for paying dividends. The imputation tax system in Australiahad led to the expectation that firms should pay the maximum possible franked dividends.Using panel data from January 1994 to December 2004, I found strong evidence that dividendpayout ratio and likelihood of paying dividends were positively related to ownershipconcentration, profitability, firm size, the presence of dividend reinvestment scheme and taxpaid, and were negatively related to leverage, growth opportunity, business risks and investment.My findings supported the conjecture that dividend policy could be explained by tax reasons,residual theory and agency relationship simultaneously.]]>
<![CDATA[OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE AND THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ROLE OF DIVIDENDS ]]>
<![CDATA[Lukas Setia Atmaja]]>
<![CDATA[ Jurnal Keuangan dan Perbankan Vol 12, No 1 (2008): January 2008 ]]>
Publisher : <![CDATA[University of Merdeka Malang ]]>
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DOI: 10.26905/jkdp.v12i1.873
<![CDATA[This paper reviewed the theoretical and empirical literature on the relationshipbetween ownership structure and dividends. Agency theory suggested that dividend was servedto reduce agency problems between owners (or large controlling shareholders) and managers(or minority shareholders) by reducing the amount of free cash flow and increasing monitoringby external parties. It also proposed that ownership concentration and composition mightmitigate or exacerbate agency problems. We might expect substitutability or complementaryrelationship existed between dividend and ownership concentration/composition. Empiricalevidence showed that the relationship between dividend and managerial or large shareholdingscould be negative (i.e., consistent with substitute argument), positive (i.e., consistent withcomplementary argument) or non-linear (i.e., consistent with entrenchment hypothesis). Inaddition, the literature suggested that family controlled firms might expropriate minorityshareholders by paying lower dividends or mitigate moral hazard conflicts by distributingmore cash. Empirical research on this issue, however, provided mixed findings.]]>
<![CDATA[Does Board Size Really Matter? Evidence from Australia ]]>
<![CDATA[Lukas Y. Setia-Atmaja]]>
<![CDATA[ Gadjah Mada International Journal of Business Vol 10, No 3 (2008): September - December ]]>
Publisher : <![CDATA[Master in Management, Faculty of Economics and Business, Universitas Gadjah Mada ]]>
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DOI: 10.22146/gamaijb.5559
<![CDATA[This study examines the impact of board size of Australian firms on Tobin’s Q. Agency theory suggests that there is an inverse relationship between board size and Tobin’s Q (Yermack 1996; Eisenberg et al. 1998). The resource dependence argument, however, hypothesizes that larger boards can lead to higher performance as the CEO’s need for advice is a function of the complexity of the organization (Pfeffer 1972; Klein 1998). Analyzing a panel data of 1,530 firm-year observations using random effects technique, this study finds a positive relationship between board size and Tobin’s Q. The random effects regression results also reveal that the positive relationship between board size and Tobin’s Q is driven by firm size as this positive relationship is only found in larger firm sample but not in the smaller firm sample. The overall results support the resource dependence argument.]]>
<![CDATA[Corporate Governance in Family Firms ]]>
<![CDATA[Lukas Setia-Atmaja]]>
<![CDATA[ INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH JOURNAL OF BUSINESS STUDIES Vol 1, No 1 (2008): May 2008 ]]>
Publisher : <![CDATA[Universitas Prasetiya Mulya ]]>
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DOI: 10.21632/irjbs.1.1.15
<![CDATA[This paper reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on the corporate governance in family controlled firms. In particular, it discusses conficts of interest between owner and manager (referred to as Agency Problem I) as well as between minority and large shareholders (referred to as Agency Problem II) among family frms under agency theory framework. It is widely believed that families are better monitors of managers than other types of large shareholders, suggesting that Agency Problem I are less prevalent in family than in non-family frms. On the other hand, it is also argued that controlling families may extract private benefits at the expense of minority shareholders. In addition, the governance literature indicates that several conventional governance tools for controlling Agency Problem are less efective in dealing with Agency Problem II.Keywords: Agency problems, corporate governance, family control, boards of directors]]>
<![CDATA[Cross-Border Mergers and Acquisitions in China: A Test of the Free Cash Flow Hypothesis ]]>
<![CDATA[Chandera, Yane]]>;
<![CDATA[Atmaja, Lukas Setia]]>
<![CDATA[ Indonesian Capital Market Review Vol. 6, No. 2 ]]>
Publisher : <![CDATA[UI Scholars Hub ]]>
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<![CDATA[This research investigates whether Chinese cross-border investments have positive impact on shareholders wealth and whether the amount of bidders’ free cash flow influences the shareholder returns resulted from the acquisitions. The sample is based on 77 top Chinese cross-border investments during the years 2005-2009 with each deal value of minimum US$100 million. The assessments of acquisition abnormal returns are based on the event study methodology (Brown & Warner, 1985). Cross-sectional regression analysis is used to determine the bidding firms factors which significantly affect the returns. Factors are examined using OLS with White’s heteroscedasticity-corrected standard errors, since the assumption of homoscedasticity is likely to be violated. The study proves Chinese cross- border acquisitions result in positive abnormal returns which is consistent with synergy hypothesis. The amount of bidders’ free cash flow is also found to be marginally but positively associated with shareholders return which is consistent with Myers and Majluf’s pecking order hypothesis but unsupportive of Jensen’s free cash flow hypothesis.]]>
<![CDATA[The Governance Role of Independent Directors in Indonesian Family and Non-Family Firms ]]>
<![CDATA[Atmaja, Lukas Setia]]>;
<![CDATA[Hidayat, Athalia Ariati]]>
<![CDATA[ Jurnal Keuangan dan Perbankan Vol 25, No 4 (2021): October 2021 ]]>
Publisher : <![CDATA[University of Merdeka Malang ]]>
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DOI: 10.26905/jkdp.v25i4.6382
<![CDATA[This paper examines the governance role of independent directors in Indonesia using family and non-family firm samples. The literature suggests that independent directors can mitigate conflicts of interest between controlling families and non-controlling or minority shareholders among family firms. This study utilizes panel data of firms listed from 2005 to 2019, comprising 4.865 firm-year observations. Our result reveals that the performance of family firms is significantly worse than that of non-family firms measured by Tobin’s Q and that among family firms, independent directors or commissioners have an insignificance impact on firm value. Our findings support the expropriation theory and are not in line with the notion that independent directors can mitigate agency problems among family firms. Our analysis, however, provides strong evidence that independent directors or commissioners in non-family firms positively affect firm performance.JEL: D74, G32, H11]]>
<![CDATA[PRICE REACTION TO RIGHTS ISSUES ANNOUNCEMENT: NEW EVIDENCE FROM INDONESIA ]]>
<![CDATA[Suthiono, Henry]]>;
<![CDATA[Atmaja, Lukas Setia]]>
<![CDATA[ Jurnal Aplikasi Manajemen Vol. 17 No. 4 (2019) ]]>
Publisher : <![CDATA[Universitas Brawijaya, Indonesia ]]>
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DOI: 10.21776/ub.jam.2019.017.04.04
<![CDATA[Research on rights issues has been carried out in Indonesia with mixed results and in a short period, between 3-8 years. The results of research on rights issues in Indonesia are mostly insignificant. The number of sleep stocks can cause that. Therefore, a longer period of research is needed to examine the reaction of stock prices to the announcement of rights issues. This study uses data that has been available from 1991 to 2016 and uses an event study methodology that considers thin trading. This study found significant negative abnormal returns between -1.66% and -2.80% at different periods. Therefore, this study does not support that the Indonesia Stock Exchange is in a semi-strong efficiency. The characteristic of companies in Indonesia is the family company, but this is not considered in this study, which can be considered for further research.]]>
<![CDATA[The Impact of Family Control on Dividend Policy: Evidence from Indonesia ]]>
<![CDATA[Atmaja, Lukas Setia]]>
<![CDATA[ International Research Journal of Business Studies Vol. 9 No. 3 (2016): December 2016 - March 2017 ]]>
Publisher : <![CDATA[Universitas Prasetiya Mulya ]]>
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DOI: 10.21632/irjbs.9.3.147-156
<![CDATA[This paper examines the relationship between family control and dividend policy in Indonesia. There are three possible explanations for the relationship. The expropriation hypothesis predicts that family control has a negative impact on dividend payouts. Meanwhile the reputation hypothesis and the family income hypothesis predict that family control has a positive impact on dividend payouts. Using a panel data of Indonesian publicly listed firms in the period of 2003-2009, the results shows that family control has a significant negative impact on dividend payouts, dividend yields and likelyhood to pay dividends. The results control for other variables that may potentially affect dividend payments such as growth opportunity, debt, profitability, firm size and firm age. From agency theory perspective, the finding is consistent with the argument that family controlling shareholders prefer lower dividends, in order to preserve cash flows that they can potentially expropriate (the expropriation hypothesis).]]>
