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All Journal Jurnal Keuangan dan Perbankan Gadjah Mada International Journal of Business JAM : Jurnal Aplikasi Manajemen International Research Journal of Business Studies (E-Journal) Indonesian Capital Market Review International Research Journal of Business Studies
Lukas Setia Atmaja
Universitas Prasetiya Mulya
Decision Sciences, Operations Research & Management Economics, Econometrics & Finance Social Sciences

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Ownership Concentration and Firm Value : A Panel Data Analysis on The Impact of Ownership Concentration on Firm Value Atmaja, Lukas Setia
International Research Journal of Business Studies Vol. 2 No. 2 (2009): August-November 2009
Publisher : Universitas Prasetiya Mulya

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | DOI: 10.21632/

Abstract

This study examines the impact of ownership concentration on firm value. This study finds a negative and significant relationship between ownership concentration (measured by aggregate substantial shareholdings and the presence of controlling shareholders) and firm value. This suggests that large or controlling shareholders can extract the private benefits of control which in turn leads to lower firm value. The results support the rent extraction hypothesis, but not the agency relationship.
Corporate Governance in Family Firms Atmaja, Lukas Setia
International Research Journal of Business Studies Vol. 1 No. 1 (2008): May-July 2008
Publisher : Universitas Prasetiya Mulya

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | DOI: 10.21632/

Abstract

This paper reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on the corporate governance in family controlled firms. In particular, it discusses conflicts of interest between owner and manager (referred to as Agency Problem I) as well as between minority and large shareholders (referred to as Agency Problem II) among family firms under agency theory framework. It is widely believed that families are better monitors of managers than other types of large shareholders, suggesting that Agency Problem I are less prevalent in family than in non-family firms. On the other hand, it is also argued that controlling families may extract private benefits at the expense of minority shareholders. In addition, the governance literature indicates that several conventional governance tools for controlling Agency Problem are less effective in dealing with Agency Problem II. This implies that other internally determined governance mechanisms such as boards of directors may play a more significant and effective role in controlling Agency Problem II in family firms.
Co-Authors Athalia Ariati Hidayat Suthiono, Henry Yane Chandera