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All Journal Melintas An International Journal of Philosophy and Religion
Mustika, I Ketut Sawitra
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Religion Arts Humanities Languange, Linguistic, Communication & Media Social Sciences

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Konsistensi Will dan Thing-in-Itself: Menafsir Ulang Metafisika Schopenhauer Mustika, I Ketut Sawitra; Harsawibawa, Albertus
MELINTAS An International Journal of Philosophy and Religion (MIJPR) Vol. 37 No. 2 (2021)
Publisher : Faculty of Philosophy, Parahyangan Catholic University, Bandung

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | DOI: 10.26593/mel.v37i2.6296

Abstract

This article aims to present a different reading from the mainstream interpretation that corners Schopenhauer: a consistent interpretation. The authors use a method of acquiring knowledge by acquaintance and description. Schopenhauer’s theory is often considered inconsistent because it concludes will as a thing-in-itself. The will, which is obtained through direct observation of the body, is a representation that is still shrouded in the veil of time form, while thing-in-itself is completely different from representation, and is beyond the reach of space, time, and causality, with reference to principle of sufficient reason. Concluding will as a thing-in-itself is therefore considered inconsistent. However, this interpretation might be wrong because Schopenhauer never claimed that direct observation of the body would yield knowledge of the thing-in-itself. From the very beginning, he realised that direct knowledge of thing-in-itself was impossible, because the knowledge, regardless of its form, was always knowledge of appearances. He knows that will does not qualify as a thing-in-itself. The true function of the will in Schopenhauer's metaphysics lies in the name and concept by which one can think about thing-in-itself objectively.
Konsistensi Will dan Thing-in-Itself: Menafsir Ulang Metafisika Schopenhauer Mustika, I Ketut Sawitra; Harsawibawa, Albertus
MELINTAS An International Journal of Philosophy and Religion (MIJPR) Vol. 37 No. 2 (2021)
Publisher : Faculty of Philosophy, Parahyangan Catholic University, Bandung

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | DOI: 10.26593/mel.v37i2.6296

Abstract

This article aims to present a different reading from the mainstream interpretation that corners Schopenhauer: a consistent interpretation. The authors use a method of acquiring knowledge by acquaintance and description. Schopenhauer’s theory is often considered inconsistent because it concludes will as a thing-in-itself. The will, which is obtained through direct observation of the body, is a representation that is still shrouded in the veil of time form, while thing-in-itself is completely different from representation, and is beyond the reach of space, time, and causality, with reference to principle of sufficient reason. Concluding will as a thing-in-itself is therefore considered inconsistent. However, this interpretation might be wrong because Schopenhauer never claimed that direct observation of the body would yield knowledge of the thing-in-itself. From the very beginning, he realised that direct knowledge of thing-in-itself was impossible, because the knowledge, regardless of its form, was always knowledge of appearances. He knows that will does not qualify as a thing-in-itself. The true function of the will in Schopenhauer's metaphysics lies in the name and concept by which one can think about thing-in-itself objectively.
Co-Authors Harsawibawa, Albertus