The Global Positioning System (GPS) is the primary source of position for modern ship navigation, and its value depends on how well it is integrated with other bridge equipment such as RADAR/ARPA, the Electronic Chart Display and Information System (ECDIS), and the Automatic Identification System (AIS). This study analyses the use of GPS for determining ship course and position on the tanker MT New Winner, identifies the factors that hinder its optimal use, and proposes solutions. A descriptive qualitative design was applied over 12 months of sea service, using observation on the bridge, semi-structured interviews with four deck officers (the Master and the Chief, Second, and Third Officers), and a review of manuals and literature. While the vessel was sailing in the Makassar Strait, GPS1 (Furuno GP-150), the only receiver interfaced with RADAR/ARPA, ECDIS, and AIS, failed. Although GPS2 (GP-170) still displayed the ship’s position, it was not connected to the other systems, so the Master had to plot the position manually every 30 minutes to avoid the risk of grounding. The failure was caused by a damaged GPS antenna and its mounting, broken antenna shock absorbers, poorly maintained cables and keys, and an inadequate power supply. The study concludes that GPS use on board was not optimal because of the lack of redundant integration and insufficient maintenance. Connecting both GPS units to all navigation systems, maintaining the antenna, cabling, and power supply regularly, and practising alternative position-fixing methods are recommended.
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