<![CDATA[This study aims to analyze the influence of political party coalitions on the supervisory function of the House of Representatives (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat/DPR) within Indonesia’s presidential system and to examine its implications for the effectiveness of the checks and balances principle. The research employs a normative legal research method using statutory, conceptual, and historical approaches. The legal materials consist of primary, secondary, and tertiary sources, which are analyzed qualitatively through grammatical, systematic, and teleological interpretation methods. The findings indicate that the formation of political party coalitions is a logical consequence of the combination of a presidential system and a multiparty political system in Indonesia. Political coalitions play an important role in maintaining governmental stability and supporting the effective implementation of public policies. However, the dominance of pro-government coalitions in the DPR has the potential to weaken the parliamentary oversight function due to political loyalty that affects the independence of legislators in exercising their constitutional oversight instruments, including the right of interpellation, the right of inquiry, and the right to express opinions. As a result, the supervisory function is not always carried out critically and objectively, leading to a weakening of the checks and balances mechanism. Furthermore, coalition dominance may reduce the role of parliamentary opposition as a counterbalance to governmental power. Therefore, strengthening the institutional capacity of the DPR, optimizing constitutional oversight mechanisms, and fostering a political culture that recognizes oversight as an independent constitutional responsibility are essential. These efforts are necessary to maintain governmental accountability, balance of power, and the quality of constitutional democracy in Indonesia.]]>
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