<![CDATA[Direct election of regional heads in Indonesia remains a prolonged policy contestation after more than two decades of implementation. High political costs, money politics, the phenomena of single candidates and political dynasties, violations of civil servant neutrality, and rising election disputes before the Constitutional Court have revived discourse on electing regional heads through regional legislative councils, along with the idea of asymmetric elections. This study comparatively analyzes these three models of regional head selection within a multidimensional framework combining theories of local democracy, the democratic rule of law, and asymmetric decentralization, and formulates recommendations for a model better suited to Indonesia's socio-political characteristics. The study employs normative legal research supported by secondary empirical data, using statutory, conceptual, and comparative approaches, operationalizing five evaluative indicators: political legitimacy, public participation, accountability, budget efficiency, and constitutional compliance. Findings show that the three models present inversely related strengths and weaknesses across these dimensions, and that the Constitutional Court consistently provides constitutional space for variation in election models within the unitary state framework and a clear legal basis. The study recommends a measured asymmetric election model as a middle path, supported by objective eligibility criteria, strengthened electoral integrity in regions retaining direct elections, and strengthened public accountability in regions adopting non-direct mechanisms, without disregarding popular sovereignty.]]>
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