Why Collaborative Governance Fails in Local Revenue Mobilization: Evidence from Indonesia

Fransiskus Suryanto Nara Bata (Universitas Nusa Cendana)
Aloysius Liliweri (Universitas Nusa Cendana)
Frans Gana (Universitas Nusa Cendana)
Hendrik Toda (Universitas Nusa Cendana)
I Putu Yoga Bumi Pradana (Universitas Nusa Cendana)

Jurnal Public Policy
Vol 12, No 3 (2026): July

This study explains why formally established collaborative arrangements produce limited effectiveness in local revenue mobilization, with specific attention to regional levy administration in Sikka Regency, Indonesia. Rather than treating leakage as a narrow technical or accounting problem, the article conceptualizes it as a governance problem generated through shallow collaboration among interdependent public organizations and affected stakeholders. The study employs a qualitative case study design based on in-depth interviews, observation, and document analysis involving government agencies, field collectors, regulated actors, compliant and non-compliant levy payers, community beneficiaries, civil society organizations, and media actors. Guided by the collaborative governance framework of principled engagement, shared motivation, and capacity for joint action, the analysis shows that collaboration exists procedurally but remains weak in substance. Principled engagement is constrained by narrow problem discovery, fragmented knowledge sharing, weak data-based deliberation, and limited collective determination. Shared motivation is weakened by inter-agency distrust, contested legitimacy, weak fiscal transparency, and uneven commitment to collective revenue goals. Capacity for joint action is undermined by hesitant leadership, thin institutional arrangements, non-integrated databases, weak monitoring routines, and limited administrative and digital support. The article advances the concept of shallow collaboration to describe a condition in which meetings, coordination language, and formal mandates are present, yet collective problem solving, relational commitment, and operational follow-through remain insufficient. The study contributes to collaborative governance and fiscal governance scholarship by showing how information fragmentation and relational weakness become mechanisms through which local revenue leakage is reproduced in decentralized settings. Its findings caution against assuming that formal coordination is equivalent to collaborative capacity and demonstrate why subnational revenue mobilization requires both institutionalized data integration and relationally credible governance.