<![CDATA[The development of the digital economy has encouraged the use of algorithms in price-setting by business actors. This condition has given rise to the phenomenon of algorithmic collusion, in which price coordination may occur through algorithmic systems without direct communication or written agreements between competitors. This phenomenon raises problems in criminal law because the concepts of mens rea and meeting of minds are generally constructed based on direct human conduct and intention. This study aims to analyze the criminal law qualification of algorithmic collusion in price-setting practices and to formulate an ideal model of criminal liability for business actors and/or corporations. This study employs normative legal research using statutory, conceptual, and case approaches. The results show that the use of algorithms does not automatically establish criminal liability, as liability still requires a connection between the conduct, fault, and anticompetitive behavior. Criminal liability should be determined based on the respective roles, knowledge, and involvement of algorithm providers, business users, and programmers. Therefore, normative reconstruction is required through the formulation of a new offense, broader interpretation of existing provisions, or amendments to the applicable legal framework while maintaining the principles of legality and geen straf zonder schuld]]>
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