<![CDATA[How can constitutional limits be preserved when delegating authority within Indonesia’s newly bifurcated State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) governance regime? Following the 2025 SOE Law amendments separating the SOE Regulatory Agency from the Daya Anagata Nusantara Investment Management Agency, this article analyzes the threshold where delegation devolves into an unconstitutional blanket transfer of power, aiming to formulate definitive boundaries that safeguard public accountability. Utilizing a doctrinal methodology with statutory, conceptual, case, and comparative approaches, this study evaluates Constitutional Court jurisprudence alongside the OECD Guidelines, INTOSAI-P 10, and South Korea’s Constitution. Findings reveal that broad delegation is not inherently unconstitutional; however, it becomes legally untenable when enabling statutes omit essential subject matters, scoping criteria, and accountability mechanisms, particularly if delegatees can self-determine their oversight boundaries. Consequently, this study concludes that fundamental institutional controls—specifically BPK’s auditing authority, public information access, parliamentary reporting, transaction limits on separated state wealth, and prohibitions against subdelegating public authority—must be strictly classified as non-delegable matters. Conversely, technical implementation details may be entrusted to subordinate regulations, provided they remain strictly within defined statutory limits.]]>
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