<![CDATA[The Constitutionality of Deploying Indonesian National Armed Forces Without House of Representatives Approval: A Perspective on Checks and Balances and Presidential Powers. The deployment of military forces abroad for peacekeeping missions is frequently categorized as non-war operations by the executive, thereby bypassing parliamentary approval. This practice triggers legal debates concerning the boundaries of presidential discretion and potential breaches of the principle of limited power. This study aims to analyze the constitutional basis of presidential authority and evaluate the urgency of involving the House of Representatives in deploying armed forces to maintain institutional checks and balances. The method employed is normative juridical legal research utilizing statutory, conceptual, comparative, and case approaches. The results indicate that although the president holds supreme authority over the armed forces, this power is not absolute and must remain subject to democratic control. Administrative classifications of non-war operations should not serve as an excuse to evade parliamentary oversight, given that deploying armed forces abroad carries significant political, diplomatic, and security consequences. In conclusion, such deployments require the approval of the House of Representatives to uphold the principle of checks and balances. The government is advised to promptly establish explicit regulations ensuring legal certainty for military deployment procedures.]]>
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