<![CDATA[The 2000–2001 Poso communal conflict represented a complex security challenge involving religious tension, political competition, social fragmentation, and violence that could not be addressed solely through military or law-enforcement measures. This study examines the implementation of Civil–Military Cooperation (CIMIC) among military forces, government institutions, and civilian stakeholders during the conflict, its reflection of Indonesia’s Total People’s War Strategy (Sishankamrata), and its contribution to peace resolution. This research employed a qualitative case study approach using semi-structured interviews and document analysis. Data were analyzed using the interactive model of Miles, Huberman, and Saldaña, involving data condensation, data display, and conclusion drawing and verification. The findings indicate that CIMIC was implemented through security mobilization, interagency coordination, communication and information sharing, community engagement, local protection, humanitarian support, dialogue, mediation, recovery, and reconciliation. However, implementation remained uneven due to institutional friction, differences in organizational responsibilities, and limited institutionalization of civilian participation. The findings further demonstrate that CIMIC reflected important principles of Sishankamrata, particularly the integration of military and non-military components, mobilization of national resources, and societal participation, although these principles were not comprehensively institutionalized. CIMIC contributed to peace resolution by creating security conditions for dialogue, supporting confidence building, facilitating mediation, and connecting security stabilization with recovery and reconciliation. The study concludes that CIMIC functioned as a strategic bridge between security management and peacebuilding, demonstrating that sustainable peace requires integrated cooperation among military institutions, government authorities, and society.]]>
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