Power Negotiation and the Formation of Market Dependence in Fisher–Collector Relations: A Case Study in Tanah Merah, Kepulauan Meranti Regency

Asnika Putri Simanjuntak (Universitas Riau)
Alltop Amri Ya Habib (Universitas Riau)
Mutiara Fitri (Universitas Riau)
Nada Ratković (Faculty of Social Economics, Business and Tourism, University of Split, Croatia)

Mamangan Social Science Journal
Vol 15, No 2 (2026): Jurnal Ilmu Sosial Mamangan Accredited 2 (SK Dirjen Ristek Dikti No. 0173/C3/DT

Small-scale fish marketing is shaped not only by prices and distribution routes but also by unequal access to capital, logistics, market information, and buyer networks, which can create asymmetric bargaining relations and persistent dependence on collectors. This study aims to analyze how power is negotiated and how market dependence is gradually formed within fisher-collector relations in Tanah Merah Village, Kepulauan Meranti Regency, Indonesia. The analysis draws on relational power and social embeddedness perspectives, supported by the concept of patron-client relations, to explain how access to strategic resources, trust, and repeated exchange shape bargaining and dependence. A qualitative-dominant embedded mixed-methods design was applied within a single-case study framework. The study involved 50 participants: 35 fishers completed a 63-item survey, 6 of whom were subsequently interviewed, while 15 fish collectors participated in the qualitative component. Data were collected through questionnaires, semi-structured interviews, observations, field notes, documentation, and catch-flow tracing. Quantitative data were analyzed descriptively, while qualitative data were analyzed through data condensation, coding, data display, and conclusion drawing. The findings identified three marketing channels and showed that direct access to Selatpanjang increased bargaining opportunities only for fishers with sufficient capital, transportation, catch volume, ice, and market information. Although 80.0% knew market prices, only 40.0% had freedom to negotiate prices and 31.4% could reject unfavorable offers without risking access to capital or assistance. Market dependence developed through accessible credit, flexible repayment, trust, repeated transactions, and expectations of continued catch delivery. The study concludes that power negotiation is real but asymmetric, while supportive exchange relations can simultaneously restrict market choice. The study’s novelty lies in proposing a conceptual model in which market dependence emerges progressively through the interaction of capital provision, flexible repayment, trust, repeated transactions, and buyer loyalty.