The appointment of ministers and deputy ministers within Indonesia’s presidential system exhibits an increasingly complex normative tension between the broad scope of presidential prerogative under Article 17 of the 1945 Constitution and constitutionalism demands to prevent conflicts of interest and bureaucratic inefficiency. This study aims to comprehensively analyze the evolution of the Constitutional Court's constitutional interpretation regarding ministerial appointments—through a critical examination of Decision No. 79/PUU-IX/2011, Decision No. 80/PUU-XVII/2019, and Decision No. 128/PUU-XXIII/2025—alongside the juridical implications of cabinet restructuring following Law No. 61 of 2024. Employing a normative-doctrinal legal research methodology combining statutory, case, and comparative conceptual approaches, this study explores the synthesis between positive constitutional law and Islamic constitutional jurisprudence (siyasah syar'iyyah). In this study, al-mashlahah is positioned as an overarching umbrella concept that integrates and governs derivative principles of siyasah syar'iyyah and legal maxims (qawa'id fiqhiyyah)—specifically tasharruf al-imam, sadd al-dzari'ah, dar'ul mafasid, and al-quwwah wa al-amanah—establishing a coherent logical nexus between the Constitutional Court's constitutional adjudication and Islamic public law norms. The findings reveal two fundamental points. First, the removal of the 34-ministry cap and the deletion of Article 10 under Law No. 61 of 2024 grant expansive executive discretion; however, under both modern constitutionalism and the maxim of tasharruf al-imam 'ala al-ra'iyyah manutun bi al-mashlahah, such discretion must be strictly bound by objective public welfare to prevent fiscal extravagance (israf) that undermines the protection of public wealth (hifzh al-mal). Second, the explicit prohibition of deputy ministers holding concurrent positions as SOE commissioners in the operative verdict (amar putusan) of Constitutional Court Decision No. 128/PUU-XXIII/2025 successfully eliminates constitutional evasion of prior ratio decidendi. Methodologically, this judicial prohibition aligns symmetrically with the preventive instrument of sadd al-dzari'ah, the priority maxim of dar'ul mafasid muqaddamun 'ala jalbil mashalih, and the meritocratic bureaucratic parameters of al-quwwah wa al-amanah.
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