<![CDATA[The establishment of the Daya Anagata Nusantara Investment Management Agency (BPI Danantara) creates a gap in the legal protection of creditors of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) because its controlling authority derives from statutory delegation rather than share ownership. This study aims to reconstruct the framework governing BPI Danantara’s liability to SOE creditors as a controlling entity. The study employs normative legal research and applies statutory, conceptual, historical, and comparative approaches, supported by grammatical, systematic, teleological, and functional comparative analysis. The study finds that Article 3(2)(d) of the Indonesian Company Law is structurally inadequate to address BPI Danantara’s position because its requirement of an “unlawful act” does not encompass the lawful exercise of delegated authority. The proposed reconstruction introduces a special liability provision in the SOE Law by combining the German faktischer Konzern compensation mechanism with the French Rozenblum proportionality standard. This model establishes causation-based liability, proportional compensation, an insolvency ceiling, technical delegation, and direct creditor standing.]]>
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