The amendment to the DPR Rules of Procedure through DPR Regulation Number 1 of 2025 introduced Article 228A, which provides a periodic evaluation mechanism for state institution officials whose appointment process involves the DPR. This article examines the constitutional status of the DPR Rules of Procedure, the normative construction of Article 228A, and its implications for checks and balances and institutional independence. Using doctrinal legal research with statutory and conceptual approaches, this article argues that the DPR Rules of Procedure have limited normative force as internal parliamentary regulations and cannot serve as a legal basis for creating new powers with external legal effects absent statutory delegation. Article 228A reflects a shift from ex ante approval to ex post evaluation and may transform parliamentary oversight into institutional control when its results are constructed as binding. This article suggests that periodic evaluation should be limited to informative and recommendatory outcomes, while any legal consequences affecting state officials must be regulated at the statutory level.
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