Journal of Indonesian Social Sciences and Humanities
Journal of Indonesian Social Science and Humanities (JISSH) is a peer-reviewed international journal in English organized by Deputy of Social Sciences and Humanities, Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI). It is published biannually and covers all aspects of Indonesia, regional and international studies from Indonesian perspective. JISSH features original research papers, research/dissertation summary, and book review. We welcome manuscript that is an unpublished paper and not ongoing proccessed at other publications from scholars, policymakers, experts, practitioners, and students. The Scope of JISSH : social; humanities; economic; culture; politic; regional
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<![CDATA[Ten Years of Reforms: the Impacts of an Increase in the Price of Oil on Welfare ]]>
<![CDATA[Latif Adam]]>;
<![CDATA[Esta Lestari]]>
<![CDATA[ Journal of Indonesian Social Sciences and Humanities Vol 1 (2008): Special Issue: Ten Years Reformasi ]]>
Publisher : <![CDATA[Deputy of Social Sciences and Humanities, the Indonesia Institute of Sciences (LIPI) ]]>
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DOI: 10.14203/jissh.v1i1.8
<![CDATA[The Asian economic crisis that erupted in Indonesia in mid-1997 has resulted in fundamental changes in the structure of the Indonesian economy. For instance, although it was a controversial decision, the fuel subsidy has been extensively reduced since 2000 because of government budget constraints. This paper examines the decision of the government to eliminate the fuel subsidy (and increase the price of fuel) from 2000. It also measures to what extent such a decision has affected the level of peoples welfare in 2005. Using regression analysis, the paper indicates that the decision of the government to increase the price of oil, together with several other variables, correlates negatively with the level of peoples welfare. Based on these findings, it is recommended that the government should be careful in responding to the current conditions in the oil market where the world oil price fluctuates and has increased sharply. Instead of increasing the domestic fuel price, there are several actions that the government can take to respond to the increasing world oil price. Among them are implementing a cross-subsidy policy to redistribute income from higher to lower income groups, making comprehensive plans to increase and achieve lifting oil target, and intensifying efforts to diversify sources of energy.]]>
<![CDATA[The Ethnolinguistic Identity of the Hamap People in Change ]]>
<![CDATA[Ninuk Kleden Probonegoro]]>
<![CDATA[ Journal of Indonesian Social Sciences and Humanities Vol 1 (2008): Special Issue: Ten Years Reformasi ]]>
Publisher : <![CDATA[Deputy of Social Sciences and Humanities, the Indonesia Institute of Sciences (LIPI) ]]>
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DOI: 10.14203/jissh.v1i1.14
<![CDATA[This research was conducted after the law (No. 22/1999) on regional government had been in force for more than five years, where one of the central issues in the regional autonomy era is identity. Alor, a regency in East Nusa Tenggara Province with its 16 000 islands, is a region that is conscious of its identity; it is distinct from Timor, as well as from other regions in West Nusa Tenggara and from other areas in Indonesia. Nevertheless the question remains whether Alor is able to sustain its cultural identity in an area that is inhabited by a range of ethnic groups speaking 18 different local languages (SIL International 2001). One of the ethnic groups in Alor is the Hamap people. The Hamap live in southwest Alor, in Moru village to be specific, and they are surrounded by other ethnic groups; the Abui, the Klon, the Mor, the Adang, the Kabola and the Pura people. The Kui people are considered to be of foreign origin. This belief is legitimised by a mythological kinship between the Hamap and other ethnic groups. There are also other groups: migrants from Flores, Timor and Java.]]>
<![CDATA[Reformasi, Religious Diversity, and Islamic Radicalism after Suharto ]]>
<![CDATA[Noorhaidi Hasan]]>
<![CDATA[ Journal of Indonesian Social Sciences and Humanities Vol 1 (2008): Special Issue: Ten Years Reformasi ]]>
Publisher : <![CDATA[Deputy of Social Sciences and Humanities, the Indonesia Institute of Sciences (LIPI) ]]>
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DOI: 10.14203/jissh.v1i1.2
<![CDATA[This paper examines the rising tide of ethno-religious conflicts and Islamic radicalism in the political arena of post-Suharto Indonesia. In the climate of Reformasi that heralded freedom of expression, ethnic and religious violence flared up in various regions of Indonesia, threatening a society apparently imbued with a culture of tolerance based on harmonious inter-ethnic and inter-faith relations. In a flurry of conflicts, a number of militant Muslim groups arose and engulfed the political arena of post-Suharto Indonesia by calling for jihad and other violent actions. The rise of the groups gave a remarkable boost to the explosion of militant religious discourses and activism that threaten Indonesias reputation for practising a tolerant and inclusive form of Islam and threaten, too, the integrity of the Indonesian nation-state as well. Against the backdrop of the stateIslam relationship in the New Order, this paper looks at how this phenomenon is embedded in the states failure to manage properly religious diversity and civic pluralism. In the context of mounting competition among elites, religion has become tremendously politicised and has served more as a tactical tool used by political contenders in their own interests. Herein lies the importance of the proper management of religious diversity as a mechanism to guarantee individual freedoms and maintain the rights of religious minorities.]]>
<![CDATA[Cross-Cultural Alliance-Making and Local Resistance in the Moluccas during the Revolt of Prince Nuku, c. 1780–1810 ]]>
<![CDATA[Muridan S. Widjojo]]>
<![CDATA[ Journal of Indonesian Social Sciences and Humanities Vol 1 (2008): Special Issue: Ten Years Reformasi ]]>
Publisher : <![CDATA[Deputy of Social Sciences and Humanities, the Indonesia Institute of Sciences (LIPI) ]]>
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DOI: 10.14203/jissh.v1i1.9
<![CDATA[Fine and rare spices were the primary reason for the Europeans to establish trading posts in Asia. The Dutch took control of the Moluccas at the beginning of the seventeenth century following the establishment of the Dutch East India Company (VOC) in 1602. The use of force and diplomacy to force out their trading rivalsthe Spaniards, Portuguese and their allieswas planned and designed from the outset. How the VOCs power structures were set up in the Spice Islands of eastern Indonesia differed from place to place. In Banda, the regions power structure and organisation of trade and politics was destroyed with the extermination and forced evacuation of the Bandanese population. In Ambon, the VOC established direct rule over an indigenous population that took sixty years to assure. In Ternate, the most important state in the Moluccas at that time, the VOC employed indirect rule; it ruled through the sultans, whom they kept on a short leash by controlling successions and putting their favourites on the throne.]]>
<![CDATA[Indonesian Theatre Ten Years after Reformasi ]]>
<![CDATA[Barbara Hatley]]>
<![CDATA[ Journal of Indonesian Social Sciences and Humanities Vol 1 (2008): Special Issue: Ten Years Reformasi ]]>
Publisher : <![CDATA[Deputy of Social Sciences and Humanities, the Indonesia Institute of Sciences (LIPI) ]]>
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DOI: 10.14203/jissh.v1i1.4
<![CDATA[Theatre contributed actively to the Reformasi movement of 1998 in Indonesia, as shows were staged that united students, NGO workers, artists and others in shared criticism of the Suharto regime and aspirations for change. Modern Indonesianlanguage theatre has a long history of political involvement. Developed among students in the Dutch colonial school system, its aim was helping create the Indonesian nation. This led to friction with other political groups and with state authorities. During the New Order regime, performances conveyed criticism that could not be expressed through other channels. In the post-Suharto era, however, when political criticism can be freely expressed and there is no united opposition movement to work with, theatre necessarily connects in a different way to its social context. In Central Java, where the writers research has been based, contemporary theatrical performances are characterised by a shared focus on local identity and community. Local culture is sometimes interpreted as the indigenous cultural forms of an area, but more often as the mixed local-global culture that residents practise today. The term community is used to refer to immediate neighbours and to people with shared interests and experiences, who both watch and actively perform in plays. Such developments in theatre are clearly shaped by the heightened awareness of local identity fostered by regional autonomy and by the ideology of participatory democracy. But how do theatrical activities connect to other social forces and with the structures of the regional autonomy system? Is there any sense of future direction in the current vibrant celebration of local identity? In what ways does theatre in other regions reflect local social conditions? These important questions remain to be explored.]]>
<![CDATA[The State and Society in Conflict Resolution in Indonesia (Conflict Area of West Kalimantan and Central Kalimantan) ]]>
<![CDATA[Heru Cahyono]]>
<![CDATA[ Journal of Indonesian Social Sciences and Humanities Vol 1 (2008): Special Issue: Ten Years Reformasi ]]>
Publisher : <![CDATA[Deputy of Social Sciences and Humanities, the Indonesia Institute of Sciences (LIPI) ]]>
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DOI: 10.14203/jissh.v1i1.10
<![CDATA[Several bloody communal conflicts shook some areas in Indonesia from the late 1990s to early 2000s, including widespread violent conflicts in West and Central Kalimantan. Two groups, the Dayaks and the Malays, both asserting their status as indigenous ethnic groups, fought another ethnic group, migrants from Madura (the Madurese). The disturbances began in late February 2001 in Central Kalimantan. Thousands of Dayaks attacked the Madurese. There was violence and killing in almost all villages. The disturbances began in Sampit City and spread to Kuala Kapuas, Pangkalan Bun and Palangka Raya. More than 400 Madurese died and 80 000 people were forced to leave Kalimantan.]]>
<![CDATA[Treading the Path of the Sharia: Indonesian Feminism at the Crossroads of Western Modernity and Islamism ]]>
<![CDATA[Manneke Budiman]]>
<![CDATA[ Journal of Indonesian Social Sciences and Humanities Vol 1 (2008): Special Issue: Ten Years Reformasi ]]>
Publisher : <![CDATA[Deputy of Social Sciences and Humanities, the Indonesia Institute of Sciences (LIPI) ]]>
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DOI: 10.14203/jissh.v1i1.5
<![CDATA[The downfall of Suhartos New Order in 1998 has opened up a new era of political freedom and participation for activists and for groups that try to promote emancipatory agendas as well as for political Islamists keen on introducing tougher conservative, religious measures to society. Womens activism and participation in different sectors has flourished, and their voices have had much stronger echoes in the political dynamics of the country. However, the new era has also given rise to Islamic radicalism that is also hostile to feminist causes and perceives feminism as part of the Western hegemonic project. In such a slippery political terrain, womens movements in Indonesia have to remake the image of feminism in Indonesian terms so that it cannot be dismissed as an ideology imported from the West and, simultaneously, they must develop a home-grown counter-discourse against the mainstream interpretation of sacred texts by using the same sources of knowledge that the Islamists employ. To what extent women activists have succeeded or failed in their struggles to free Indonesian Muslim women from the shackles of the male-dominated reading of Islamic dogma, and what the future trajectories of their struggles might be, are the primary concerns of this essay.]]>
<![CDATA[Economies Based on Reward Sharing: A Case Study in Indonesia's Tertiary Sector ]]>
<![CDATA[Umi Karomah Yaumidin]]>
<![CDATA[ Journal of Indonesian Social Sciences and Humanities Vol 1 (2008): Special Issue: Ten Years Reformasi ]]>
Publisher : <![CDATA[Deputy of Social Sciences and Humanities, the Indonesia Institute of Sciences (LIPI) ]]>
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DOI: 10.14203/jissh.v1i1.12
<![CDATA[Reward-sharing activities are well known in the business world, particularly for businesses relying on trust. Today, the basic concepts of Islamic economics are widely used not only in the banking sector but also in other economic sectors. In Indonesia, the concept of profit and loss sharing (PLS), contract sharing and revenue sharing can be seen as an another model to accelerate growth after cyclic downturns. There are at least three reasons why it is important to examine this concept. First, how it affects lower investment inflows, whether domestic or foreign investment. High corruption, high risk and uncertainty are the most common reasons and influencing factors for investors wanting to invest in Indonesia, although Indonesian governments have been working hard to reduce these handicaps. Second, there are difficulties for small enterprises in getting funds from formal financial institutions and this contributes to company bankruptcies. As is commonly known, financial institutions require interest fees for credit but many small businesses cannot meet this requirement because they have not enough assets to quarantine their credit.]]>
<![CDATA[Indonesia's State Enterprises: from State Leadership to International Consensus ]]>
<![CDATA[Yasmin Sungkar]]>
<![CDATA[ Journal of Indonesian Social Sciences and Humanities Vol 1 (2008): Special Issue: Ten Years Reformasi ]]>
Publisher : <![CDATA[Deputy of Social Sciences and Humanities, the Indonesia Institute of Sciences (LIPI) ]]>
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DOI: 10.14203/jissh.v1i1.7
<![CDATA[The survival of state-owned enterprises and continued investment by the state was assisted by high rates of economic growth in Indonesia throughout the 1980s. The currency crisis in the region, which began in mid-1997, destroyed the expectation that rapid growth would continue. In this climate, the loss-making state companies were a serious financial burden, and privatisation has been promoted as a quick solution. It appears that the crisis reintroduced momentum for reform in the huge state-enterprise sector. In response to IMF pressure and its own fiscal difficulties, the government took several measures to reform the state sector. The economic crisis provided a catalyst because it forced the government to assess more seriously the value of state companies. There was an urgent need to sell state-owned assets to relieve the state budget when economic recovery slowed. This paper examines the efforts to reform the state sector during ten years of Reformasi, including the debate over privatisation and the emergence of strong resistance to reform. It appears that the crisis has strengthened the hand of reformers seeking to privatise the state sector. However, despite the logic of government efforts to reform inefficient state companies, there has been a battle with each step towards privatisation.]]>
<![CDATA[Population and Social Demographic Poverty: A Case Study in the Border Areas of East Kalimantan and North Sulawesi ]]>
<![CDATA[Ade Latifa]]>;
<![CDATA[Aswatini Aswatini]]>;
<![CDATA[Haning Romdiati]]>
<![CDATA[ Journal of Indonesian Social Sciences and Humanities Vol 1 (2008): Special Issue: Ten Years Reformasi ]]>
Publisher : <![CDATA[Deputy of Social Sciences and Humanities, the Indonesia Institute of Sciences (LIPI) ]]>
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DOI: 10.14203/jissh.v1i1.13
<![CDATA[This paper discusses the social-demographic dimensions of poverty and is based on findings from a four-year research program (20069) conducted by PPKLIPI in the border areas of East Kalimantan and North Sulawesi. The general objective of this study is to develop methods for measuring poverty using social-demographic variables: fertility, mortality, migration, education, marriage and occupation. This research used quantitative and qualitative approaches. The intention in using these two approaches was to enable comprehensive data to be gathered on multidimensional aspects of social-demographic poverty. The quantitative data were collected by using survey techniques; a sample of 400 households was taken from each area. Qualitative data were obtained from in-depth interviews, focus group discussions, observation and desk reviews. The findings show that some socialdemographic variables are likely to be related (correlate) to household poverty; such variables as mean years of schooling of household members aged 15 years and above (below six years of education), the number of children born to the household (more than two) and children below five years of age who had died in the household. The regression results (factor analysis) reveal that about 43.1 per cent and 49 per cent of households are categorised as poor households in the border areas of East Kalimantan and North Sulawesi respectively.]]>
