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People’s sovereignty in the digital sphere: Challenging conventional legislation Muhammad Safaat Gunawan; Eki Furqon
Priviet Social Sciences Journal Vol. 6 No. 6 (2026): June 2026
Publisher : Privietlab

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | DOI: 10.55942/pssj.v6i6.1852

Abstract

The role of social media is far more massive, becoming a space for articulating the aspirations of the people that influence the legislative process in Indonesia. The wave of rejection of the KPK Law, the Job Creation Law, the new Criminal Code, and even the Constitutional Court's decision reveals a paradox: the sovereignty of the people, which is guaranteed by Article 1 paragraph (2) of the 1945 Constitution, is actually stronger in the digital space than in the formal forum of the House of Representatives. Conventional legislative mechanisms are elitist, closed, wasteful of budget, and even prone to corruption, prompting the public to seek alternative channels through online petitions, hashtags, and digital demonstrations. This phenomenon raises fundamental questions about the legitimacy of formal legislation when the aspirations of the people are actually stronger in cyberspace. This study uses a normative legal method with the analytical tools of Habermas' deliberative democracy theory, digital sovereignty, and digital political participation. An international comparative study (United States, United Kingdom, Estonia, and India) shows that digital democracy can be institutionalized through official mechanisms such as e-petitions, e-voting, and online public consultations. This paper offers the concept of digital constitutional democracy, namely the integration of digital space as an official channel for public participation in lawmaking. Several breakthroughs include the digitization of Prolegnas (E-Prolegnas), a permanent public aspiration portal, digital signature verification, and the establishment of an independent supervisory body to maintain the validity of aspirations. These breakthroughs are believed to be capable of cutting down on conventional legislative practices that are elitist and wasteful, while strengthening constitutional legitimacy. Thus, Indonesian democracy can transform into a participatory, transparent, and adaptive legislative model in line with technological developments, while maintaining people's sovereignty in the digital era.
REKONSTRUKSI MEKANISME PEMANTAUAN DAN PENINJAUAN UNDANG-UNDANG DI INDONESIA: ANALISIS PROLEGNAS 2019-2024 Muhammad Safaat Gunawan; Nurul Mujahidah
Legislatif VOLUME 9 NOMOR 2 2026
Publisher : UKM Lembaga Penalaran dan Penulisan Karya Ilmiah Fakultas Hukum Universitas Hasanuddin

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | DOI: 10.20956/jl.v9i2.51002

Abstract

Abstract Monitoring and review of legislation is an integral part of the legislative cycle, aiming to ensurethe effectiveness, consistency, and responsiveness of regulations to societal dynamics. Thestrengthening of this function has been normatively emphasized in the amendment to LawNumber 12 of 2011 through Law Number 13 of 2022 concerning the Formation of Legislation, which requires legislative and executive institutions to conduct evaluations of laws. However, in practice, the mechanism for monitoring and reviewing legislation in Indonesia still faces various problems, particularly in the context of implementing the 2019–2024 National Legislation Program (Prolegnas). This study aims to analyze the normative design of the mechanism for monitoring and reviewing legislation, identify gaps between norms and empirical practice, and formulate a more effective reconstruction model for the mechanism. This study uses normative legal methods with a legislative and conceptual approach, and is analyzed qualitatively. The results show that although the normative framework has accommodated the function of legislative evaluation, its implementation remains administrative in nature, not integrated into the legislative cycle, and not evidence-based. Furthermore, monitoring of laws resulting from the 2019–2024 National Legislation Program (Prolegnas) has not been conducted systematically, which has resulted in repeated regulatory changes without comprehensive evaluation. Therefore, a reconstruction of the legislative monitoring and review mechanism is needed through an integrated, participatory, and data-driven post legislative scrutiny approach to strengthen the quality of the national legislative system.
Institutional design for the establishment of strategic agencies under the president from the perspective of the hierarchy of laws and regulations Muhammad Safaat Gunawan; Nurul Mujahidah
Priviet Social Sciences Journal Vol. 6 No. 9 (2026): September 2026
Publisher : Privietlab

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | DOI: 10.55942/pssj.v6i9.1988

Abstract

This study analyzes the constitutional issues surrounding the establishment of strategic state agencies through Presidential Regulations within Indonesia’s constitutional system. The primary focus of the study is on the use of Presidential Regulations as the basis for establishing state agencies that have a permanent structure, broad authority, strategic public functions, and utilize substantial amounts of the State Budget (APBN). This study employs a normative legal method using a statutory approach, a conceptual approach, and a comparative law approach. The research findings indicate that, theoretically, a Presidential Regulation is essentially delegated legislation of a technical-administrative nature, serving to implement norms established in laws or Government Regulations. Therefore, a Presidential Regulation should not serve as the primary instrument for establishing strategic state agencies that perform broad national public functions. The establishment of such bodies should derive its legitimacy from legislation because it is directly related to the principle of constitutional budgeting, the House of Representatives’ oversight of the use of the State Budget, and the mechanism of checks and balances in a democratic state governed by the rule of law. An analysis of bodies established based on Presidential Regulations, such as Danantara and the National Nutrition Agency, indicates that these institutions possess the characteristics of strategic bodies because they implement large-scale national programs, involves cross-sectoral coordination, utilizes significant portions of the national budget, and has a direct impact on the social rights of the public. Comparative practices in the United States, South Korea, and India also show that national institutions or programs related to the management of large public budgets generally derive their legitimacy from legislation. Furthermore, this study found that establishing strategic agencies solely through Presidential Regulations risks expanding executive power, creating bureaucratic bloat, causing overlapping authority among institutions, and opening the door to the politicization of state institutions as tools for post-election government power consolidation. Therefore, a restructuring of state institutions is needed that places legislation as the primary basis for the formation of state strategic agencies to ensure democratic accountability, legal certainty, bureaucratic effectiveness, and oversight of the use of state finances.