Claim Missing Document
Check
Articles

Found 3 Documents
Search

Pemilihan Kepala Daerah melalui DPRD sebagai Open Legal Policy: Perspektif Pasal 18 Ayat (4) UUD NRI Tahun 1945 Lefi Evti Handayani; Mardhatillah Suaka
Jurnal Multidisiplin Vol. 2 No. 4 (2026): Juni
Publisher : CV. Utami

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | DOI: 10.70963/jm.v2i4.814

Abstract

This article examines regional head elections through the Regional House of Representatives as an open legal policy from the perspective of Article 18 paragraph (4) of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia. This issue is significant because the phrase “democratically elected” does not expressly determine whether regional heads must be elected directly by the people or may be elected through a representative institution. The debate has become increasingly relevant in light of various problems associated with direct regional head elections, including high political costs, money politics, social polarization, and the budgetary burden of election administration. This article aims to analyze the legal position of regional head elections through the Regional House of Representatives as an open legal policy, compare direct and indirect models for selecting local government heads in several countries, and formulate constitutional limits to ensure that such a model does not diminish popular sovereignty. This research employs normative legal research using conceptual, statutory, and comparative approaches. The findings show that regional head elections through the Regional House of Representatives may be positioned as an open legal policy because Article 18 paragraph (4) does not constitutionally require a direct election model. However, such policy cannot be understood as unlimited legislative freedom. Election through the Regional House of Representatives can only be justified if it is designed to be open, deliberative, transparent, accountable, free from transactional politics, and accompanied by effective oversight and dispute-resolution mechanisms.
Regional Head Election through the Regional House of Representatives as an Open Legal Policy: Perspective of Article 18 Paragraph (4) of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia Mardhatillah Suaka; Lefi Evti Handayani
Jurnal Multidisiplin Vol. 3 No. 1 (2026): September
Publisher : CV. Utami

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | DOI: 10.70963/jm.v3i1.805

Abstract

This article examines regional head elections through the Regional House of Representatives as an open legal policy from the perspective of Article 18 paragraph (4) of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia. This issue is significant because the phrase “democratically elected” does not expressly determine whether regional heads must be elected directly by the people or may be elected through a representative institution. The debate has become increasingly relevant in light of various problems associated with direct regional head elections, including high political costs, money politics, social polarization, and the budgetary burden of election administration. This article aims to analyze the legal position of regional head elections through the Regional House of Representatives as an open legal policy, compare direct and indirect models for selecting local government heads in several countries, and formulate constitutional limits to ensure that such a model does not diminish popular sovereignty. This research employs normative legal research using conceptual, statutory, and comparative approaches. The findings show that regional head elections through the Regional House of Representatives may be positioned as an open legal policy because Article 18 paragraph (4) does not constitutionally require a direct election model. However, such policy cannot be understood as unlimited legislative freedom. Election through the Regional House of Representatives can only be justified if it is designed to be open, deliberative, transparent, accountable, free from transactional politics, and accompanied by effective oversight and dispute-resolution mechanisms.    
Corporate Funding in Local Elections: A Study of Civil Liability and Democratic Governance Rachmat Akbar; Ilham Kurniawan Ardi; Zico Junius Fernando; Mardhatillah Suaka
Prosiding Seminar Nasional Program Doktor Ilmu Hukum 2026: Prosiding Seminar Nasional Program Doktor Ilmu Hukum
Publisher : Universitas Muhammadiyah Surakarta

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar

Abstract

This study examines whether unlawful corporate funding in local elections may give rise to corporate civil liability for harm to the public interest. Corporate financing can undermine democratic governance by shifting public officeholders’ priorities from the public interest toward political donors. Although Indonesian election law regulates campaign contributions, enforcement has largely focused on the administrative and criminal liability of individuals, leaving corporate civil liability and public interest protection insufficiently addressed. The study argues that unlawful corporate funding should trigger civil liability because it facilitates conflicts of interest, policy distortions, and patronage-based political exchanges that threaten the public interest. Its novelty lies in reconceptualizing unlawful corporate political funding as a basis for corporate civil liability and a mechanism for restoring the public interest within electoral law. Using normative and qualitative legal research with theories of liability, political exchange, and reciprocity, the study finds that limited investigative audits, individual-centered enforcement, and weak sanctions against corporations hinder accountability in political financing. Transactional relationships between corporations and elected officials further increase the risk of private interests prevailing over public interests. The study recommends strengthening corporate civil liability mechanisms and public interest restoration within electoral law to enhance democratic accountability.