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All Journal Jurnal Ekonomi, Manajemen, Akuntansi
Herry Respati Kusuma
STIE GICI
Economics, Econometrics & Finance Social Sciences

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A Sectoral Analysis of PSAK 73’s Impact on Financial Reporting and Covenant Compliance: Implications for State-Owned Enterprises on Indonesia’s Strategic Projects Bagus Satrio Utomo; Herry Respati Kusuma; Novita Triyatun; Ince Ahmad Zarqan
EKOMA : Jurnal Ekonomi, Manajemen, Akuntansi Vol. 5 No. 3: Maret 2026
Publisher : CV. Ulil Albab Corp

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | DOI: 10.56799/ekoma.v5i3.13457

Abstract

Implementation of PSAK 73 (Leases, now superseded by PSAK 116), Indonesia's adoption of IFRS 16, represents a structural shift in financial reporting, affecting ratio volatility and decision-making for public entities, particularly State-Owned Enterprises (BUMN) executing National Strategic Projects (PSN). By eliminating the operating lease classification, the standard mandates Right-of-Use (RoU) asset and lease liability recognition for virtually all contracts, effectively ending off-balance-sheet financing. Comparison from PT Garuda Indonesia Tbk, PT Telkom Indonesia Tbk, PT Jasa Marga Tbk, and construction SOEs (BUMN Karya) demonstrates sector-dependent effects. While aviation liabilities surged over 8,600% and telecommunications rose 548.5%, the construction and energy sectors faced unique challenges related to heavy equipment and infrastructure leases. The standard distorts key financial metrics, artificially inflating EBITDA and Operating Cash Flow (OCF), while depressing Return on Assets (ROA) and exacerbating Debt-to-Equity Ratios (DER). These distortions create significant risks of "technical default" on debt covenants and compromise the accuracy of capital budgeting models (NPV/IRR) used for strategic project evaluation. The analysis further examines secondary effects, including agency theory implications on managerial behavior, the rise of short-term lease engineering, and the divergence between credit rating methodologies and banking covenant compliance. PSAK 73 enhances transparency but necessitates a fundamental recalibration of financial analysis frameworks, funding strategies, and asset management practices.
The Dialectics of Rent-Seeking and Value Creation: An Economic Analysis of Constitutional Constraints in Indonesia’s Danantara Bagus Satrio Utomo; R Edi Sewandono; Novita Triyatun; Herry Respati Kusuma; Ince Ahmad Zarqan
EKOMA : Jurnal Ekonomi, Manajemen, Akuntansi Vol. 5 No. 5: Juli 2026
Publisher : CV. Ulil Albab Corp

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | DOI: 10.56799/ekoma.v5i5.16623

Abstract

The establishment of Badan Pengelola Investasi Daya Anagata Nusantara (Danantara) represents a paradigmatic shift in Indonesia’s state capitalism, consolidating state-owned enterprise assets exceeding USD 57 billion within an unprecedented super-holding governance structure. This article employs constitutional political economy and economic analysis of law to interrogate the hypothesis that institutional designs permitting high executive discretion without adequate constitutional constraints generate exponential agency costs. Through comparative institutional analysis contrasting Danantara with Temasek Holding, Khazanah Nasional, and 1MDB as a counterfactual failure, this study applies Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) agency theory, Williamson’s (1985) transaction cost economics, and North and Weingast’s (1989) credible commitment framework to evaluate the efficiency implications of presidential appointment authority. The analysis demonstrates that Danantara currently occupies a suboptimal position on the institutional possibility frontier, positioned within a rent-seeking zone characterized by high political interference risk and moderate transparency. The article argues that legal legitimacy depends upon implementing credible commitment mechanisms, specifically constitutionalized investment mandates, arm’s length director selection procedures, and minority shareholder protections, that constrain ultra vires risks while preserving operational efficiency. These findings demonstrate that without adequate institutional engineering, asset consolidation amplifies agency costs multiplicatively through cascading principal-agent relationships, potentially resulting in welfare losses exceeding 8–12 percent of assets under management.
Co-Authors Bagus Satrio Utomo Bagus Satrio Utomo Ince Ahmad Zarqan Novita Triyatun R Edi Sewandono