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All Journal Jurnal Ilmu Hukum KYADIREN LEGAL BRIEF Hakamain: Journal of Sharia and Law Studies
Camelia, Noer Dini
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Law, Crime, Criminology & Criminal Justice

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Journal : LEGAL BRIEF

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Limiting the age for candidates of public officials viewed by human rights and moral perspective Lutfiadi, Lutfiadi; Camelia, Noer Dini; Wardani, Win Yuli; Heryanti, Febrina; Wahyono, Sapto
LEGAL BRIEF Vol. 13 No. 2 (2024): June: Law Science and Field
Publisher : IHSA Institute

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | DOI: 10.35335/legal.v13i2.982

Abstract

Elections are a key requirement of a democratic state. Democracies uphold human rights. There are human rights that can be restricted and Elections are a key requirement of a democratic state. Democracies uphold human rights. There are human rights that can be restricted and those that cannot. The right to be elected and to vote in public office is a human right that can be restricted by the state, but the restriction must be based on reasons that are in line with morality. This research aims to understand whether restrictions on the right to be elected and to vote based on age are in line with the law and morals or vice versa. This research is normative legal research that focuses on the problem of legal norms at the level of positive law, legal theories, and principles. The approaches used are legislation, literature review, conceptual approaches. The result is that all forms of restrictions on the community to participate in state life are restrictions on human rights. Restrictions on human rights are a violation of moral values. The conclusion is that a democratic state should not limit a person's right to vote and elect. The state should leave it entirely up to the people, whether they want to vote for that person or not. The Constitutional Court should not create new norms, the Constitutional Court should only have the authority to declare a certain legal norm contrary to the 1945 Constitution or not
The existence of arbitration verdict cancellation efforts regarding final and binding characteristics Camelia, Noer Dini; Lutfiadi, Lutfiadi; Heryanti, Febrina; Wardani, Win Yuli; Purwandi, Agustri
LEGAL BRIEF Vol. 13 No. 2 (2024): June: Law Science and Field
Publisher : IHSA Institute

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar

Abstract

The arbitration verdict must include a verdict implementation period. It is based on the arbitration verdict characteristics based on Article 60 AADR LAW (Law on Arbitration and Alternative Dispute Resolution), namely that an arbitration verdict is final, has permanent legal force, and is binding on both parties; therefore, the legal consequences do not only apply to the parties who are arbiter but also arbitration verdicts cannot be further tested for legal consequences by other institutions. However, the provisions of Article 60 AADR LAW are followed by the provisions of Article 70 AADR LAW, which allows for arbitration verdict cancellation by the District Court as in Article 71 AADR LAW. Hence, this research aims to determine the binding power of an arbitration verdict and the District Court’s authority in canceling an arbitration verdict. The research methodology was normative research with statutory and conceptual approaches. The research results stated that efforts to cancel the arbitration verdict by the District Court had implications for the loss of the final and binding characteristics of the arbitration verdict. Efforts to cancel the arbitration verdict required to reconsider its existence
Application of Vicarious Liability Principles to Losses from the Use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) from a Civil Law Perspective Camelia, Noer Dini; Wardani, Win Yuli; Purwandi, Agustri; Ayuni, Alfika Putri; Aini, Nur Jannatul
LEGAL BRIEF Vol. 14 No. 6 (2026): Law Science and Field
Publisher : IHSA Institute

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | DOI: 10.35335/legal.v14i6.1518

Abstract

The existence of Artificial Intelligence (AI) as an artificial intelligence system not only provides many benefits but can also cause losses in its use if the AI produces an error that causes harm to others. The occurrence of losses due to the use of AI is certainly related to who is responsible and what form of liability is incurred for the losses caused. The purpose of this study is to determine the form of liability for the use of AI that causes harm based on the principle of vicarious liability or substitute liability. The research method used in this study is normative legal research with a statute approach and a conceptual approach. The results of the study show that, from a civil law perspective, AI cannot be categorized as a legal subject, whereby actions performed by AI are not legal actions that can be held liable. Therefore, the form of liability that can be applied to losses arising from the use of AI is the application of the principle of vicarious liability. In civil law, liability can generally take the form of unlawful acts (Article 1356 of the Civil Code) and vicarious liability (Article 1367 of the Civil Code). The principle of vicarious liability is contained in the provisions of Article 1367 of the Civil Code, which is a form of vicarious liability to another party who is responsible for the actions of another party under their responsibility. Thus, the principle of vicarious liability can be applied in fulfilling the need for a form of liability for losses arising from the use of AI before there are regulations that specifically regulate AI
Co-Authors ACHMAD RIFAI Aini, Nur Jannatul Aprilia , Gabriel Ayuni, Alfika Putri Hanayanti, Citra Siwi Heryanti, Febrina Iskandar, Toillah Lutfiadi, Lutfiadi Purwandi, Agustri Wahyono, Sapto Wardani , Win Yuli Wardani, Win Yuli