<![CDATA[The high cost of politics in Indonesia's general elections is a critical structural issue threatening the quality of democracy and the integrity of political representation. This study analyzes the causal link between the open-list proportional representation system stipulated in Article 168 (2) of Law No. 7 of 2017 on General Elections and the escalating financial burden on candidates, while proposing a Mixed-Member Proportional (MMP) system as a constitutional law reform alternative (ius constituendum). Employing a qualitative normative legal research method combined with a comparative legal approach, this article examines legal norms, campaign finance mechanisms, and the institutional experiences of Germany and Japan. The findings demonstrate that the open-list system fuels intense intra-party competition and capital-centric candidate campaigns, leading to hyper-inflated election expenditures and endemic vote-buying practices. Conversely, while closed-list proportional representation minimizes candidate spending, it risks entrenching intra-party oligarchy and alienating voters from their representatives. Consequently, the MMP system is presented as a contextual solution that harmonizes political party institutionalization with popular sovereignty, effectively curbing candidate campaign costs through a balanced allocation of single-member district seats and proportional party-list seats.]]>
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