<![CDATA[This study examines the constitutional tensions between democratic decentralization and centralization in local executive elections in Indonesia and Hungary. Using a normative legal method with statutory and comparative approaches, it analyzes legislation and key decisions of the Constitutional Courts of both countries, the European Court of Human Rights, and the Court of Justice of the European Union. The findings reveal two contrasting models. Indonesia adopts a uniform direct election system dominated by political parties, with asymmetric arrangements for special regions. Hungary applies a hybrid model based on citizen signature nominations (ajánlóív) and minority self-governments. Despite these differences, both countries face challenges to local democracy. Indonesia confronts a legitimacy deficit arising from the centralized appointment of acting regional heads, while Hungary has weakened local autonomy through centralized administrative oversight. Based on these findings, the study proposes five reforms for Indonesia: indirect election of governors by the Regional People's Representative Council (DPRD), a signature-based candidate nomination system, affirmative measures for non-territorial minorities, stronger campaign finance oversight through audited Special Campaign Fund Accounts (RKDK), and improved accessibility and independence of electoral dispute resolution through Bawaslu, the State Administrative Court (PTUN), and the Constitutional Court.]]>
