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Journal : Jurnal Konstitusi

Mengkritisi HP-3 Perspektif Konstitusi dan Pemberdayaan Rakyat (Kontribusi Teori Sosiologi Membaca Putusan Nomor 3/PUU-VIII/2010) Tobroni, Faiq
Jurnal Konstitusi Vol 9, No 2 (2012)
Publisher : Mahkamah Konstitusi Republik Indonesia

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | Full PDF (390.049 KB) | DOI: 10.31078/jk%x

Abstract

This paper aims to criticize the contradictions of Rights of Coastal Management (HP-3) against the 1945 Constitution and the spirit of community empowerment. HP-3 became norm of the procedures for permitting management of Coastal and Small Islands Resources (SDP-PPK) as regulated in Law Number 27 Year  2007.    The recent study collects data through literature approach and analyzes them through qualitative methods. The findings are as follows. HP-3 is contrary to the 1945 Constitution. Unconstitutionality of HP-3 is caused by changing  SDP-PPK  from being common property right to be property right and ignoring alignments    to vulnerable populations (indigenous and traditional fisherman). The principle of empowerment that has significant power to revive the spirit of the constitution in HP-3 is improvement of capabilities and power for vulnerable people. These steps must be taken by creating articles that contain affirmative action for vulnerable people.
Menguatkan Hak Masyarakat Adat Atas Hutan Adat (Studi Putusan MK Nomor 35/ PUU-X/2012) Tobroni, Faiq
Jurnal Konstitusi Vol 10, No 3 (2013)
Publisher : Mahkamah Konstitusi Republik Indonesia

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | Full PDF (574.584 KB) | DOI: 10.31078/jk%x

Abstract

If the Government is always consistent to ensure the rights of indigenous  people over ulayat forest, of course there will be no legislation which is contrary to the constitution, because the constitution had always guaranteed it. The Decision of Constitutional Court Number 35/PUU-X/2012 which declares that Article 1 point 6, Article 4  paragraph  (3),  article  5  paragraph  (1),  paragraph  (2), paragraph (3) of Law 41/1999 on Forestry unconstitutional shows  that  there is inconsistency in regulating indigenous forest. In the perspective of human rights, the articles have a spirit of protection of  indigenous  peoples’  rights over ulayat forest which is repressive derogable in nature. Meanwhile, the Constitutional Court decision has the spirit of progressive derogable protection. The first spirit means that because the state could derogate the recognition of ulayat forest if it is incompatible with the development of society and contrary to the principles of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia, then the ulayat forest should be seen as the state forest. In the contrary, the next spirit means that although the state could derogate the recognition based on the preceeding requirements, the ulayat forest should be defined as ulayat forests. The first spirit   is a repressive one because it aims at subordinating ulayat forests in the name of state forests. Meanwhile, the progressive spirit has the character of liberation and empowerment, it aims at removing the term of ulayat forests from state forests.
Keterlibatan Negara dalam Mengawal Kebebasan Beragama/ Berkeyakinan (Komentar Akademik atas Judicial Review UU No.1/PNPS/1965) Tobroni, Faiq
Jurnal Konstitusi Vol 7, No 6 (2010)
Publisher : Mahkamah Konstitusi Republik Indonesia

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | Full PDF (379.61 KB) | DOI: 10.31078/jk%x

Abstract

A theory having been known in the discourse of civil and political rights is a state has to act by omission (by not to do anything that can limit to as well as oppress these rights). It is this theory that was used as argument to petition for judicial review of law No.1/PNPS/Th.1965. This law was regarded having limited freedom of conscience and religion, that are parts of civil and political    rights.After the implementation of freedom of conscience and religion have been evaluated, this should not be absolute because it will cause instability of harmony of religious community. The uncontrolled freedom, in fact, will encourage the deviation. The deviation that often happens is the mistaken interpretation.It caused the misuse or desecretion of religion.The state as organizer of people life, therefore, has the responsibility  for controling the implementation of religious freedom in the light of harmony, and for preventing it from the misuse or desecretion. It is in  this moment that Law No.1/PNPS/Th.1965 has been regulated to control the religious freedom in the light of harmony.
Antara Cita-cita Konservasi dan Kerentanan Masuk Sandera Eksploitasi (Kajian Atas Beberapa Judicial Review terhadap UU Kehutanan) Tobroni, Faiq
Jurnal Konstitusi Vol 8, No 3 (2011)
Publisher : Mahkamah Konstitusi Republik Indonesia

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | Full PDF (434.672 KB) | DOI: 10.31078/jk%x

Abstract

This paper aims to discuss some decisions of the Constitutional Court on judicial review of the Forestry Law. There are both positive and negative. A positive decision, to my opinion, can seen in No 013/PUU-III/2005   and No 021/PUU-III/2005. The reason I regard as a positive is based on the consequences of decision, which legitimates article about the ban on illegal logging in forests and the confiscation of equipment for stealing wood as constitutional ones. It is supporting conservation.A decision that negatively affects the spirit of conservation is noted in decision No. 003/PUU-II/2005. This ruling tends to prioritize legal certainty for mining companies to resume an open mine system in the preserved forestry. The author saw this one as reflection  of  the  legal policy construction on forestry law that is taken hostage by exploitation interests.This paper, furthermore, tries to uncover the legal policy construction on forestry law as the base of problem sources. Therefore, the author needs to search for not only informations which are in the textual decision, but also ones are beyond it. The larger model of legal policy can be seen from the process of determining emergency condition when formulating the Stipulation of Government Regulation in Lieu of Law (Perpu), then when changing the Perpu become law, and government regulations concerning forestry post-decision of the Court Number   003/PUU-II/2005.The advantage of this paper is on efforts to uncover the source alignments of forestry law on the big corporation based on decision number 003/PUU-II/2005. It to know this source that could be an important basis to understand why decision of the Constitutional Court on the preserved forest is taken  hostage.
Kebebasan Hak Ijtihad Nikah Beda Agama Pasca Putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi Tobroni, Faiq
Jurnal Konstitusi Vol 12, No 3 (2015)
Publisher : Mahkamah Konstitusi Republik Indonesia

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | Full PDF (451.821 KB) | DOI: 10.31078/jk1239

Abstract

This paper has three key issues. The first issue discusses the arguments constructed by applicant of judicial review (JR) to assess the constitutional rights’ violations caused by the application of Article 2 (1) UUP. The second issue discusses on how the Constitutional Court (MK) seated position of state associated marital affairs in the rejection of JR. The third issue discusses model of freedom of ijtihad (legal thought) on interfaith marriage as the impact of MK’s Decision. Based on    the discussion, regarding to the first issue, the applicant of JR assess the application of Article 2 (1) UUP has legitimized the state as the sole interpreters of religious teachings for a requirement validity of the marriage. According to the applicant,  the role is used by the state (The Office for Religious Affairs/KUA) to not accept interfaith marriage. This refusal led to the violation of some other constitutional rights. Furthermore, as the findings of the second issue, MK’s decision has placed   the real position of state not as interpreters of religious teachings, but merely to accommodate the results of religious scholars’s ijtihad regarding marriage into the state law. Thus, it is not true that the state has violated the constitutional right to more intervene the religious life of citizens. Last findings as the third issue, MK’s decision has affected the model of ijtihad freedom on interfaith marriage. Actually interfaith marriage can still be served through the Civil Registry Office (KCS). KCS could be an alternative way to facilitate the interfaith marriages for all religions in Indonesia. Special for KUA, the institution reject to record interfaith marriage.   In this way, it only accommodates freedom of ijtihad within the limits of ijtihad jama’i. KUA just accomodates ijtihad by institutions such as the Majelis Ulama Indonesia, Nahdlatul Ulama, Muhammadiyah and other similar institutions that reject interfaith marriage. Special for marriage in muslim community, ijtihad jama’i is better than ijtihad fardiy because the second could trigger the liberalization of marriage laws (temporary marriages, polygamy more than four, underage marriages and denial of recording).
Putusan Nomor 74/PUU-XII/2014 dan Standar Konstitusional Dispensasi Perkawinan Tobroni, Faiq
Jurnal Konstitusi Vol 14, No 3 (2017)
Publisher : Mahkamah Konstitusi Republik Indonesia

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | Full PDF (518.396 KB) | DOI: 10.31078/jk1436

Abstract

Putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi (MK) Nomor 74/PUU-XII/2014 meninggalkan harapan yang belum terpenuhi, yakni rumusan standar konstitusional sebagai pertimbangan dalam pemberian dispensasi umur perkawinan. Makalah ini akan menjawab alasan mengapa MK menolak merumuskannya? dan bagaimana standar konstitusional yang bisa dirumuskan? MK menolak permohonan pemohon judicial review untuk menjadikan kehamilan di luar perkawinan sebagai satu-satunya standar pemberian dispensasi umur perkawinan. Penolakan ini mengisyaratkan MK menganggap bahwa hal itu merupakan open legal policy; suatu saat bisa berubah sesuai dengan kebutuhan dan konteks masyarakat. MK juga tidak menggunakan UUD 1945 untuk merumuskan rumusan standar konstitusional dispensasi perkawinan karena hal itu harus ditempuh melalui legislative review. Sebagai tawaran dari penulis dalam legislative review, standar konstitusionalnya bisa dirumuskan melalui pendekatan hukum non sistematik dan pembacaan maqashid syari’ah. Pertimbangannya harus memperhatikan perlindungan kepentingan agama (Pasal 28E ayat (1) UUD 1945), kepentingan kepastian hukum bagi pelaku (Pasal 28D ayat (1) UUD 1945), kebebasan kehendak dan keyakinan (Pasal 28E ayat (2) UUD 1945), kepentingan kesejahteraan hidup (Pasal 28H ayat (1) UUD 1945), dan hak asasi yang dimiliki keturunan (Pasal 28B ayat (1) UUD 1945).The decision of Constitutional Court Number 74/PUU-XII/2014 leaves the unmet expectations, which is the standard for an exemption in marital age. The paper will provide the answer to the reason why the Court refused to set the standard? And how the Court should formulate it as the constitutional standards? The Court rejected the petitioner arguments in the judicial review case to make pre-marital pregnancy as the only standard to set an exemption of marital age. It suggests that the Court considers it is an “open legal policy”; where the policy may change according to the needs of society. The Court also did not use the Constitution to give the interpretation on the constitutional standard in marital exemption because it must be pursued by way of review by the parliament. The author offers, in term of legislative review, that the standards can be formulated through a non-systematic legal approach and the interpretation of maqashid syari’ah. The arguments should pay attention to the protection of religious interests (Article 28E (1) of the Constitution), the interests of legal certainty of the citizens (Article 28D (1) of the Constitution), free will and belief (Article 28E (2) of the Constitution), the welfare (Article 28H (1) of the Constitution), and the rights of descendants (Article 28B (1) of the 1945 Constitution).